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Preface 
Among the various types of proceedings provided for in the 
Treaties establishing the European Communities, requests for 
preliminary rulings are those which are, quite rightly, of greatest 
interest to te national courts and to practitioners of law in the 
various Member States. Of all the proceedings which may be 
brought before the Court, those under Article 177 are the most 
frequently resorted to: it need only be stated, without giving 
precise statistics, that half of the cases before the Court are 
requests for preliminary rulings. Not only because of their 
frequency, but also because of their particular characteristics, 
such proceedings have over the years made a major contribution 
to the clarification and development of Community law. I shall 
deal with the preliminary-ruling procedure in three parts: first, I 
shall make a number of basic points regarding its raison d'etre 
and function; I shall then consider how it operates in practice; 
and finally, I shall consider the problems and difficulties which 
have arisen in practice from recourse to this procedure. 
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Part 1: The raison d'etre and function of 
the preliminary-ruling procedure 
Historical background 
Although the reference for a preliminary ruling has been an extraordinarily successful 
procedure within the European Communities, it was not invented by the authors of 
the European Treaties. Similar judicial procedures exist in the internal law of various 
Member States, for example in relations between civil, criminal and administrative 
courts. Indeed the reference for a preliminary ruling occupies a particularly impor-
tant place in the organization of constitutional courts. Thus, it is often resorted to in 
constitutional cases in Germany and Italy, where the courts are entitled, or even ob-
liged, to refer to the constitutional court questions of constitutionality arising in pro-
ceedings before them; Spain has adopted the same system in its new constitution. 1 
In the European Treaties, the reference for a preliminary ruling appears for the first 
time in Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty, which provides that 'The Court shall have sole 
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on the validity of acts of the High Authority 
and of the Council where such validity is in issue in proceedings brought before a na-
tional court or tribunal'. Apart from one recent case, that Article has remained a 
dead letter within the system of the ECSC Treaty. 2 That should cause no surprise: 
management of the common market in coal and steel is concentrated in the hands of 
the Communtiy (more precisely, of the Commission, which took over from the old 
High Authority), so that the national authorities rarely have occasion to take any 
action in that connection. However, that provision is important from the historical 
point of view because it served as a model for the preliminary-ruling procedure pro-
vided for by the EEC and Euratom Treaties. 
When the Treaties of Rome were being negotiated, it was decided to extend the pro-
cedure for preliminary rulings on questions of validity to questions of interpretation. 
Under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Treaty and the validity and interpret-
ation of acts of the institutions of the Community. Every national court before which 
such a question arises is entitled, and supreme courts are under an obligation, to seek 
a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice if they consider that a decision on the 
question raised is necessary to enable them to give judgment. It was as a result of that 
extension of its scope that the procedure for preliminary rulings became a veritable 
living institution within the European legal system. That is particularly true in so far 
as the general common market is based on a largely decentralized system and ex-
tensive powers of management are vested in the authorities of the Member States. 
It should be noted that the procedure for preliminary rulings was subsequently exten-
ded to the Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, by virtue of the Protocol of 3 June 
1971. There too, the preliminary-ruling procedure is actively used. 3 
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The application of Community law in the Member States as a 
precondition for references for preliminary rulings 
In order to understand the preliminary-ruling procedure it is necessary first to con-
sider the effect of Community law in the Member States. Numerous rules of Commu-
nity law are applicable in one way or another within the Member States. That is the 
case with the substantial number of Treaty provisions which the Court has held to 
have direct effect, such as the rules on the free movement of goods, non-discrimina-
tion in tax matters, equality of treatment for nationals of the Member States as 
regards freedom of establishment and the right to work and provide services. Then 
there are all the Communtiy regulations, since under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty 
regulations are not only binding in their entirety but are also 'directly applicable' in 
all Member States. Moreover, whilst it is true that Community directives and deci-
sions are, primarily, addressed to the States and not to private individuals, even they 
can, on occasions, be relied upon by private individuals, for example with a view to 
the interpretation of harmonized national law or where a Member State has not 
fulfilled its obligations deriving from Community measures of that kind within the 
prescribed period.4 
Thus, national courts of all categories find that, of the legal rules which they are 
called upon to apply, an increasingly large proportion are provisions emanating from 
the European Communities. It is also possible, and indeed frequent, for them to be 
faced with conflicts between their national law and the provisions of Community law. 
Finally, since all the Member States recognize the principle that the acts of public 
administrative authorities are reviewable for their legality, there are occasions when 
disputes are brought before the national courts relating to the validity of measures of 
secondary Community law, for example regulations, directives or decisions. Since the 
national Courts have the task of applying the rules of Community law, within the 
limits of their jurisdiction, and of resolving any disputes and conflicts which may 
arise from the application thereof, they encounter problems relating to the interpre-
tation of rules of Community law or the validity of measures adopted by Community 
institutions. It is to assist them in resolving such problems and at the same time to 
ensure that Community law is interpreted and applied in a uniform manner through-
out the Community that the procedure for preliminary rulings was specifically created. 
It should be noted that problems of this kind may arise in all kinds of legal pro-
ceedings, and sometimes very unexpectedly. They are encountered above all in 
commercial, administrative, financial and social cases. However, questions con-
cerning the interpretation of Community law also arise, and arise more often than 
would be thought, in criminal proceedings. Numerous economic and tax laws 
incorporate criminal provisions involving penalties which are sometimes severe. More 
and more frequently, traders being prosecuted for the infringement of such pro-
visions seek to defeat national law by reliance upon the rules of Community law, for 
example those concerning the marketing of products, the provision of services, 
transfers of funds, the prohibition of tax discrimination, and so forth. Thus, 
problems of Community law can emerge in an area which does not at first sight 
appear to fall within its purview. 5 
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Purpose of the preliminary-ruling procedure 
Article 177 indicates that requests for a preliminary ruling may have two purposes: 
First, interpretation of the Treaty and of measures of secondary law; and, secondly, 
questions concerning the validity of measures adopted by institutions. Both call for 
more detailed discussion. 
(a) In most cases, requests for a preliminary ruling concern the interpretation of 
clearly identified provisions either of the Treaty itself or of a measure of secondary 
law, that is to say a regulation, a directive, a decision or any other Community 
measure producing legal effects. However, requests for interpretation have not, in 
practice, been confined solely to those areas. 
In the first place, the question has arisen whether international agreements 
concluded by the Community may be the subject of requests for interpretation. The 
Court's reply to that question was that they may. The Community is vested with 
powers in the sphere of external relations and is entitled to conclude international 
agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, on matters falling within those powers. 
Such agreements fall within the category of 'acts of the institutions of the Commu-
nity' within the meaning of Article 177.6 Such acts are contractual in nature and are 
governed by international law, which entails certain consequences regarding their 
interpretation and the effects of the interpretation given by the Court. Of course, the 
Court can only interpret international agreements on behalf of the Community and 
with respect to the Community; it is obvious that such interpretations could not be 
binding on non-member countries which are parties to those agreements. The Court 
has adopted the same approach in the case of agreements in which the Community 
was substituted for the original parties, the Member States, as a result of the transfer 
of powers within the area of commercial and customs policy. The Court has interpreted 
Article 177 in this way in order to ensure that all agreements binding the Community are 
interpreted and appplied in exactly the same way throughout the Community. 7 
Another practical problem which has emerged lies in the question whether the 
preliminary-ruling procedure provided for by Article 177 can be used by the national 
court with a view to obtaining a ruling from the Court of Justice on unwritten 
principles inherent in Community law or on how to supply lacunae in the Treaties or 
measures of secondary law. The question has arisen above all in connection with the 
safeguards for fundamental rights laid down by Community law and the application 
of certain general principles of public administration. It is of course well known that 
an interpretation does not consist only in the clarification of the meaning of the 
written terms of the law; a legal system is a living system involving intimate inter-
action between the written word of legislation and certain legal concepts which are so 
well established that they have not been embodied in any legal instrument. The Court 
has therefore always accepted questions seeking a preliminary ruling clarifying general 
principles inherent in the Community legal order or supplying lacunae in the system. 8 
(b) As regards questions of validity, which of course may relate only to secondary 
legislation, certain practical problems have presented themselves. 
In the first place, a close link has emerged between interpretation and validity. Indeed 
it is possible that a piece of Community legislation, interpreted in a certain way, can 
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be 'purged' of the defects which it would display if interpreted otherwise. For that 
reason national courts sometimes submit the same question simultaneously in terms 
of interpretation and in terms of validity; on more than one occasion, the Court has 
interpreted disputed legislation in such a way that it was possible to uphold its validity. 9 
In the second place, it is important to note the connection which exists between the 
questions of validity raised under Article 177 and the action for annulment provided 
for in Article 173 of the Treaty. The Court of Justice recently had occasion to em-
phasize that the examination of question of validity under Article 177 is, in reality, 
nothing more than a transposition of the concepts associated with the action for an-
nulment to the preliminary-ruling procedure. Because of that interconnectedness, the 
Court was able to apply the second paragraph of Article 174 of the Treaty to the pre-
liminary-ruling procedure, thus enabling it to limit in time the effects of a declaration 
of invalidity, so as not to affect rights and obligations existing by virtue of a regula-
tion that has been declared invalid. 10 
The third practical problem which has arisen lies in identifying the criteria which the 
Court may use in appraising the validity of a Community measure. Can it declare 
that a measure of secondary law is invalid because it is contrary to certain general 
principles of law? Or can it do so because it is contrary to a rule of international law? 
On that point, the Court has always adopted a broad view of 'Community legality' 
such as is to be found in Article 164 of the Treaty and in the first sentence of Article 
173. A Community measure can therefore be declared invalid for not conforming to 
any legal rule which must be complied with within the framework of Community law, 
whatever the nature and origin thereof, including therefore considerations drawn, for 
example, from general principles of law or rules of international law . 11 
Finally, attention should be drawn to the prudent approach which the Court adopts 
whenever it considers that it must reject the doubts raised regarding the validity of a 
measure adopted by a Community institution, which in practice is what happens most 
frequently. In such circumstances, it refrains from affirming that the measure in 
question is 'valid'; it confines itself to saying, using a hallowed form of words, that: 
'Consideration of the question submitted has not disclosed any factor of such a kind 
as to affect the validity of the measure in question'. It is indeed perfectly conceivable 
that a fresh objection may be made subsequently, on other grounds, leading to a 
declaration that the measure is invalid. The position is different, however, where the 
Court decides that the measure must be declared invalid: such a finding is irrevo-
cable. In such a case the preliminary ruling may truly be said to take effect erga 
omnes. I shall return to this subject later. 
The spirit of the preliminary-ruling procedure 
The preliminary-ruling procedure is based on a division of tasks between the national 
court and the Community Court, on a partnership between them in the discharge of a 
function which is in the common interest, namely the proper application of Com-
munity law throughout the Community. Without establishing any hierarchy between 
the national courts and the Court of Justice, this procedure makes it possible, by the 
interaction of question and answer, to guarantee the uniformity of Community law 
throughout the Community as regards its interpretation and the appraisal of the 
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questions of validity which may arise in its application. The Court has always 
endeavoured to ensure that this dialogue can be undertaken and pursued in a spirit of 
cooperation, this being possible only if the cooperation is mutual, that is to say, if the 
national court on the one hand and the Community court on the other are aware of 
their respective functions in the accomplishment of a task which is in the common 
interest of the European Community as a whole. 
The spirit of this cooperation was clearly brought out by the Court in its judgment 
of 1 December 1965 in Schwarze. In that case, the French Goverment had strongly 
criticized the questions submitted by the Hessisches Finanzgericht and asked the 
Court to declare them to be inadmissible. The Court replied that it was necessary 
to reject strict adherence to formal requirements in 'the special field of judicial 
cooperation under Article 177 which requires the national court and the Court of 
Justice, both keeping within their respective jurisdiction, and with the aim of en-
suring that Community law is applied in a unified manner, to make direct and 
complementary contributions to the working out of a decision' .12 
The procedure cannot produce its best results unless the national courts are alert to 
the problems of Community law which arise within their jurisdiction and are ready to 
recognize that the unity of that law in a Community in which there are so many dif-
ferent legal systems can be guaranteed only if there is a central court - the Court of 
Justice - which is responsible for ensuring the observance of common rules which 
are acceptable to everybody. The Court, for its part, has always been concerned to 
achieve a precise understanding of the problems faced by the national courts and to 
carry out its tasks so as to help them to solve the contentious problems with which 
they are confronted and to discharge the sometimes heavy responsiblities which they 
must assume. By virtue of the effective functioning of this procedure over the years, 
it has been possible gradually to perceive the outlines of what may be called without 
exaggeration a 'European judicial authority', which is decentralized and yet also cen-
tralized, in so far as, by joined efforts channelled through the preliminary-ruling pro-
cedure, the Court of Justice and the national courts guarantee the unity of Commu-
nity law and its efficacity within the various national legal systems. 
Over and above the need for unity, which is a dominant theme both in the requests 
for preliminary rulings from national courts and in the rulings of the Court, the pre-
liminary-ruling procedure has made a great contribution to the growth of Community 
law. Every lawyer, whether he concerns himself with the law as a judge, or as a prac-
titioner or for the purposes of research, knows that judicial interpretation, quite 
apart from its contentious function, is at the same time an eminently creative process 
in so far as it enables the law to be consolidated in those areas where it is unstable, to 
be clarified where it is uncertain, and to be developed where it is inappropriate or in-
complete. It is not therefore by chance that the decisions of the Court which have 
made the most conspicuous contribution to the development of Community law have 
been delivered as part of the preliminary-ruling procedure, a procedure concerned 
first and foremost with interpretation: the direct effect of Community law, its pri-
macy over national law, the protection of fundamental rights, the principles relating 
to the common market and the law of competition, the social dimension of the 
Community, and so forth, have been defined in preliminary rulings to a much greater 
extent than in direct actions. 13 
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Part 2: The Article 177 procedure 
in practice 
In this part, I shall endeavour to present the preliminary-ruling procedure by follow-
ing its various stages in the order in which they occur: the emergence of the problem 
before the national court and the formulation of the request for a ruling, the course 
of the procedure before the Court and, finally, the preliminary ruling and its effects. 
The emergence of the problem from the point of view of the national 
court 
With the constant growth of Community action, in terms of its content, intensity and 
scope, problems of Community law arise more and more frequently in proceedings 
before national courts. They arise, for example, in proceedings brought by individ-
uals against the administration, the revenue authorities and the social security 
institutions; or where a person is defending himself against criminal charges; or 
where private individuals are involved in proceedings before a commercial court or 
proceedings relating to competition. 
(a) Let us first see who takes the initiative in raising a question. Normally, it is 
the parties who seek to rely upon Community law to defend their interests and ask 
the court to request a preliminary ruling. It is also possible, and indeed not excep-
tional, for the court itself to be the first to perceive the problem of Community law 
and to question the parties about it. And sometimes, although this is not always the 
most appropriate procedure, the court raises a question requiring a preliminary ruling 
without even advising the parties. All these possibilities fall within the scope of 
Article 177, which allows a reference to be made to the Court where a question 
involving Community law 'is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State'. 
The Court has always construed that provision as having an objective meaning, in the 
sense that a request for a preliminary ruling becomes possible as soon as a question 
concerning Community law arises before a national court, and it is of little impor-
tance whether it came first to the mind of one of the parties or first to the mind of 
the judge.'4 It is at this first stage that an appraisal - of which the importance will be 
examined shortly - is made by the national court: it is for the court to determine 
whether the solution to the question raised is, as Article 177 states, 'necessary to 
enable it to give judgment'. This is what is normally known as the question of 
'relevance'. Consideration and appraisal of this question is a matter for the national 
court and for the national court alone.•s It will be seen that this fact has important 
consequences regarding the division of tasks, in this area, between the national court 
and the Court of Justice. 
(b) Once the intention has been formed to have recourse to the preliminary-ruling 
procedure, it is necessary to formulate the appropriate question or questions. In most 
cases, one of the parties to the dispute takes it upon himself to suggest a question to 
the court; it is also possible for the parties to come to an agreement between 
themselves on the questions to be submitted to the Court of Justice. What will be the 
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attitude of the national court to such initiatives? Certain judges merely pass on to the 
Court of Justice, without amendment, the questions suggested to them and they usu-
ally mention this fact explicitly in the order for reference. This attitude is found 
above all in the United Kingdom courts, which are accustomed to allowing the parties 
to take the initiative in the manner in which the proceedings are conducted. The 
question may be asked whether that is a good method. It has been seen, in fact, that 
the parties have a tendency all too easily to word their questions in a manner which 
entraps the Community Court in their own particular logic. It is therefore certainly 
preferable for the national court to adopt a critical approach to the questions sub-
mitted by the parties, even if the parties agree amongst themselves, and, if necessary, 
to reformulate them from the standpoint of the person whose responsibility it is to 
determine the dispute in a spirit of neutrality and objectivity. 
In fact, there is very considerable diversity in the manner in which questions are 
formulated and it must be stated at the outset that, in principle, all the methods of 
formulation are good. The attitude of the Court has always been to accept the 
questions as the national court sees fit to put them, to endeavour to understand them 
and to give a helpful reply to them. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that there 
are ways of formulating questions which facilitate the task of the Community Court 
and there are other ways which make its task more difficult. Without doubt, specific, 
simple and direct questions constitute the best starting point for useful replies from 
the Court. 16 Conversely, care should be taken to avoid two extremes which are 
encountered in practice. On the one hand, there are courts which confine themselves 
to passing the file on a case to the Court and asking it to resolve the problems of 
Community law found in it. 17 At the other extreme, there are highly abstract and 
complicated questions, with an abundance of hypotheses and alternatives. 18 In yet 
other cases, the Court is drowned in a flood of questions which cannot all be relevant 
at the same time. 19 In a word, the national court ought to be aware that by submitting 
its question or questions in simple and comprehensible terms, close to the reality of 
the facts of the case and also to the rules which are to be interpreted, it will create the 
best starting point for a useful reply from the Court. 
(c) The questions themselves will be incorporated in a judicial pronouncement 
which simultaneously stays the national proceedings and refers the matter to the 
Court. The form of that pronouncement is of little importance: that is a question 
governed by the rules and customs of national procedure. Most courts in the Com-
munity make an order, others deliver a judgment or an interlocutory decision, and 
others use a document issued by the Registrar or another officer of the court, to 
which the questions and accompanying comments are annexed. The grounds upon 
which the request for the ruling is based are of great importance for the Court and, in 
this area, there are profound differences between the various national legal systems. 
Certain courts do no more than attach to the questions submitted the minimum pro-
cedural information necessary to identify the nature and the origin of the case. 
Others take the trouble, and it is a practice greatly to be recommended, to set out the 
background and the facts of the case and also the arguments of the parties, in order 
to show how the request for a preliminary ruling arose, and they explain the legal 
problem involved more extensively. Where a question is submitted by a superior 
court, it is important for the Court of Justice to be informed of the decisions taken 
by the courts which gave judgment in the same case at first instance and, where 
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appropriate, on appeal. Certain courts, in particular German and Italian courts, are 
even concerned to make known their opinion on how the question should be re-
solved, in order to enable the court either to confirm their position or to give its 
reasons for taking a different view. 20 All these precautions facilitate the task of the 
Court of Justice, which is alert to the benefit of being well informed as to the facts 
and background, the views of the parties and the opinion of the judges who have 
dealt with the case. In order to complete this information, the referring courts are 
asked to send their file on the case to the Court of Justice; the file is returned to them 
with the judgment containing the preliminary ruling. 
(d) At what stage in legal proceedings must a request for a preliminary ruling be 
made? More precisely, should the court submit a question before establishing the 
facts? The choice of the time, in the same way as the wording of the questions, is of 
course a matter within the discretion of the national court; it has the responsiblility of 
determining the most appropriate moment. But it should be pointed out that the 
Court of Justice prefers to give its ruling at a stage where the facts have already been 
established and the area of national law involved has been defined, rather than at a 
stage where it is compelled to reply on the basis of hypotheses and alternatives, which 
certainly does not facilitate determination of the law. 21 Is it preferable to raise 
questions at first instance or is it better to wait for the appeal? Of course, it is highly 
desirable to have reciprocal contacts, as wide-ranging as possible, between the Court 
and the superior courts of the Member States; but it has been seen in practice that 
misunderstandings involving Community law can persist, moving laboriously from 
one court to another, and a considerable time can thus be wasted before the Court of 
Justice has an opportunity to clarify them. 22 In other words, a court of first instance 
or court of appeal should not hesitate to approach the Court of Justice where a 
sufficiently clearly defined question of Community law presents itself in the pro-
ceedings before it. 
(e) Finally, a last, but not unimportant, practical remark is called for. Once the de-
cision to seek a preliminary ruling is taken by the national court, how is it to be trans-
mitted to the Court? The answer is to be found in Article 20 of the Statute of the 
Court: 'The decision of the court or tribunal of a Member State which suspends its 
proceedings and refers a case to the Court shall be notified by the court or tribunal 
concerned'. In other words, the documents are sent direct from court to court or, 
more specifically, from registry to registry. National courts should be strongly ad-
vised against going through the intermediary of any administrative or diplomatic 
channels. Such a procedure involves not only the risk of delays and oversights but 
also the possiblity that the political authorities might be tempted to intercept 
questions which they find inconvenient. 
Optional references and compulsory references 
Article 41 of the ECSC Treaty makes it obligatory for every national court to seek a 
preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice where the validity of any measure adop-
ted by an institution is in issue in proceedings before it. When Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty was drafted, it was decided not to keep the wording in such general terms, so 
as to prevent the Court disappearing beneath a flood of requests for preliminary ru-
lings. Article 177 therefore draws a distinction: 
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(i) where a question of interpretation or of validity is raised before a court or tri-
bunal of a Member State, it may, if it considers that a decision on that point is 
necessary to enable it to give judgment, ask the Court of Justice to give a ruling 
thereon; 
(ii) where such a question is raised in proceedings pending before a national court or 
tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, 
that court or tribunal is obliged to seek a ruling from the Court of Justice. 
In other words, all courts may seek a preliminary ruling. Supreme courts must do so. 
The application of this system has given rise to various problems. 
(a) In the first place, it is necessary to determine what is to be understood by the 
words 'a national court or tribunal against whose decisions there is no judicial 
remedy under national law'. Two theories have been expounded on this subject, one 
of which may be called the 'organic' theory and the other the theory of the 'specific 
case'. According to the first theory, the obligation contained in the third paragraph 
of Article 177 attaches only to courts which, within the judicial system, are at the top 
of the hierarchy. According to the second theory, it is necessary to look not at the 
hierarchical position of the court but rather at whether, in a given dispute, a court 
gives its decision at last instance. Thus, in certain Member States, even a lower court 
may give judgment at first and last instance in disputes where the interests involved 
are limited. In certain Member States, such as the United Kingdom, an appeal is not 
possible unless the court grants leave to appeal, so that the court itself decides 
whether or not there is any judicial remedy against its decision. This question could 
give rise to endless discussion. I personally consider that, having regard to the 
rationale of the third paragraph of Article 177, preference should be given to the 
'organic' theory. This view will be better illustrated by the observations which follow. 
(b) The question to be answered is what is the raison d'etre of the obligation im-
posed by the third paragraph of Article 177 upon courts and tribunals against whose 
decision there is no judicial remedy? By using that expression, the Treaty is referring 
to supreme courts whose jurisdiction extends throughout the territory of a given 
Member State. It is they which, ultimately, lay down the case-law applicable to all 
matters which fall within their jurisdiction. 23 It is necessary to ensure - and this is 
the thinking which inspires the system provided for in Article 177 - that, in matters 
of Community law, case-law does not develop in the supreme courts which differs as 
between the various Member States. Moreover, it is necessary to ensure that in this 
way case-law does not become established which would give rise to conflicts with 
Community law that would be difficult to resolve, since there would be no way of 
dealing with them otherwise than by bringing an action before the Court for the 
failure of a State to fulfil its obligations. It is therefore specifically with respect to the 
supreme courts that the preliminary-ruling procedure must be able to play, in every 
case, its preventive role. These considerations militate in favour of the 'organic' 
theory, rather than the theory of the 'specific case'. 
(c) Difficult problems have arisen regarding determination of the scope of the obli-
gation imposed upon supreme courts by the third paragraph of Article 177. 
There is one point which is easy to resolve since it concerns a shortcoming in the 
drafting of Article 177. The second paragraph of that Article grants courts and 
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tribunals a margin of discretion in so far as it provides that they may request a ruling 
if they consider 'that a decision on the question [that is to say, the question of 
Community law] is necessary to enable [them] to give judgment'; that, as I have said, 
is the assessment of the 'relevance' of the settlement of the dispute. However, the 
same wording does not re-appear in the third paragraph of Article 177. But it is 
reasonable to think - and the Court has always taken this approach - that supreme 
courts have the same margin of discretion as any other court regarding the relevance 
of a question. It is not therefore sufficient for a question to be raised by the parties; 
the Court - and this applies also to supreme courts - must also consider the 
question to be relevant to settlement of the dispute. 24 
A second problem was likewise settled long ago. In one of its very early decisions, the 
Court recognized that there was a limit to the obligation of supreme courts to request 
a ruling in cases where a provision of Community law had already been the subject of 
interpretation in earlier proceedings. This is the effect of the judgment of 27 March 
1963 in DaCosta en Schaake, which was similar to the well-known case of Van Gend 
& Loos, in which judgment had been given not long earlier: where a question of law 
has already been dealt with in a previous decision of the Court, the obligation im-
posed on supreme courts by the third paragraph of Article 177 ceases to have any 
purpose. 25 But, of course, a supreme court is always entitled to seek a ruling from the 
Court of Justice, even if the point of law with which it is concerned has already been 
previously dealt with. In other words, the aforesaid judgment provides national 
courts of last instance with a choice in cases where a question of law has already been 
resolved by the Court: either it follows the decision already adopted and, in that case, 
its obligation to seek a ruling ceases to have any purpose; or else it expresses reserva-
tions and, in such a case, like every court it is entitled to seek a further ruling from 
the Court of Justice. 
There is a third question, however, which is much more difficult. Under Article 177, 
a point of Community law must constitute a 'question' for the Court. However, it is 
possible that the court considers that the solution to it is so obvious that, as far as it 
is concerned, there is no 'question' and that, accordingly, a reference for a ruling 
would serve no practical purpose. This is referred to in some quarters as 'absence of 
all reasonable doubt' or as the 'doctrine of the clear meaning of provisions'. The 
question had for a long time been a matter of discussion, until the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione brought the problem before the Court of Justice, in the Cilfit case, which 
gave rise to the judgment of 6 October 1982, to which I have already referred on 
several occasions.26 In response to that request for a ruling, the Court adopted a 
flexible attitude which was inspired by the spirit of trust and cooperation which must 
exist between it and the superior courts of the Member States. It recognized that 
situations may exist in which a question of Community law put to a national court 
does not give rise to any reasonable doubt and that, in such circumstances, that court 
may itself assume the responsibility of giving an answer, without having recourse to 
the preliminary-ruling procedure. However, the Court accompanied that decision by 
several warnings. It drew attention to the fact that a court, even a supreme court, is 
not alone in the Community and that, in resolving a point of law which seems to it to 
be clear, it cannot be satisfied with its subjective conviction but must seek to establish 
'inter-subjective' certainty, that is to say to ensure that any other court in the 
Community and the Community Court itself would decide the same question in the 
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same way; in other words, it is important for the national court to be aware of the 
Community responsibility which it assumes in such circumstances. In that connec-
tion, the Court drew attention to the fact that the Community is a multi-lingual 
grouping, made up of Member States with different legal systems, and that Com-
munity law is also different from the national systems. In other words, the national 
court must be aware of the relativity of its system of reasoning. It cannot therefore 
take for granted that what seems clear according to its own criteria will also be clear 
according to the criteria of the other Member States and the criteria of the Com-
munity. 
The course of the procedure before the Court 
The arrival at the Court Registry of the decision seeking a ruling sets in motion a pro-
cedure whose scope is significantly greater than that of the procedure before the 
national court. However, it is not an independent procedure: all those who take part 
in it must be aware that the Community phase is only a step in the proceedings 
which, having commenced before the national court, will also finish before that 
court. It is the national court which, as the Court of Justice has so often emphasized, 
will at the end of the day assume responsibility for deciding the case before it, and 
the whole procedure is organized with that ultimate responsibility in mind. 
The Court expressed that view in eloquent terms in its judgment of 29 November 
1978 in the Pigs Marketing Board case, in which the Goverment of the United 
Kingdom had criticized rather strongly the questions submitted by the national 
court and asked the Court to indicate to it which of the questions raised seemed to 
it to be pertinent. The Court refused to comply with that request and stated that: 
'As regards the division of jurisdiction between national courts and the Court of 
Justice under Article 177 of the Treaty the national court, which is alone in having 
a direct knowledge of the facts of the case and of the arguments put forward by 
the parties, and which will have to give judgment in the case, is in the best 
position to appreciate, with full knowledge of the matter before it, the relevance 
of the questions of law raised by the dispute before it and the necessity for a pre-
liminary ruling so as to enable it to give judgment'. It added however that 'in the 
event of questions' having been improperly formulated or going beyond the scope 
of the powers conferred on the Court of Justice by Article 177, the Court is free 
to extract from all the factors provided by the national court, and in particular 
from the statement of grounds contained in the reference, the elements of Com-
munity law requiring an interpretation - or, as the case may be, an assessment of 
validity - having regard to the subject-matter of the dispute. 27 These words are 
repeated in numerous subsequent judgments. 
(a) Under Article 177, the preliminary ruling procedure is a procedure 'from court 
to court'. Of course, the parties will have an opportunity to express their opinion but, 
basically, the procedure operates between the national court and the Community 
Court. A number of practical consequences flow from this. 
Thus, it is not possible for third parties to intervene in preliminary ruling proceed-
ings; apart from the goverments of the Member States and the institutions of the 
Community, only the parties to the proceedings before the national court are entitled 
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to express their views. The Court does not allow any initiatives by the parties which 
go beyond the scope of the national court's request; in particular, the parties are not 
entitled to modify the questions submitted by it. 28 
What is the position where an appeal is lodged against a decision to seek a ruling? 
Certain writers, and indeed certain courts, consider that the second paragraph of 
Article 177 confers an inalienable right upon the national court; according to that 
view, an appeal cannot, by its very nature, lie against a decision to seek a ruling. For 
its part, the Court has adopted a more liberal approach. It considers that a decision 
to seek a ruling, adopted within the sphere of national law, remains subject, as 
regards its validity, to the national rules of procedure. It is not therefore possible to 
rule out an appeal against a decision to seek a ruling. However, attention must be 
drawn to the difficulties to which an appeal may lead in this type of procedure; those 
difficulties depend on whether or not the appeal has a 'remitting' effect, that is to say 
whether it leaves the matter to proceed before the lower court or remits it to the 
superior court. In order to escape such complications and to avoid becoming involved 
in assessments which are a matter of national law, the Court has adopted the 
following very simple approach: once a request for a preliminary ruling has been 
lodged, the Court considers that it is to proceed until such time as it receives notifi-
cation to the effect that the case has been withdrawn or suspended, emanating either 
from the referring court or from a superior court. In no case has the Court relied 
upon information of that kind originating either from a private party or from the 
government of a Member State. It therefore treats the request as subsisting and 
follows the procedure in the normal way unless and until it receives notice of a 
judicial pronouncement to the contrary. 29 
Finally, there is a last detail which shows clearly that the preliminary-ruling pro-
cedure is merely a step in the action before the national court: the Court of Justice 
does not, under this procedure, take any decision regarding costs, that being a matter 
which is left to the national court to deal with in the judgment bringing the pro-
ceedings to an end. It is to be noted however that, by virtue of Article 104 (3) of its 
Rules of Procedure, the Court may grant out of its own budget, as legal aid, as-
sistance for the purpose of facilitating the representation or attendance of a party. 
(b) Let us now examine the preparatory stage of the proceedings before the Court. 
As soon as it is received, the decision seeking a ruling is translated into all the official 
languages of the Community and, in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 
20 of the Statute, is sent, in the appropriate languages, to the parties to the main pro-
ceedings, to the governments of the Member States, to the Commission, and to the 
Council where a question casts doubt on the validity or interpretation of an act of 
that institution. All those parties are entitled to submit written observations to the 
Court within a period of two months as from notification, plus extensions on account 
of distance, which adds several extra weeks. At the same time, a summary of the ref-
erence is published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. As will be 
seen, the European Parliament is not automatically notified but, by virtue of Article 
21 of the Statute, the Court is entitled to seek 'information' from it, which it does 
where any proceedings involve the prerogatives of that institution (for example where 
the validity of a regulation is contested on the ground that the Parliament has not 
been properly consulted). 
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When the written procedure is completed, the judge-rapporteur submits to the Court 
a preliminary report, at the end of which he must indicate two things: whether any 
further information is required and whether the case should be dealt with by the full 
Court or should be assigned to one of the chambers. It should be pointed out, that in 
preliminary-ruling proceedings, the Court cannot carry out inquiries in the strict 
sense of the term, since that is a matter for the national court. Nevertheless, in a sub-
stantial proportion of cases it considers that further information is required. Since an 
approach to the national court (which would give rise to a fresh and protracted phase 
of the procedure) is not possible, it endeavours to procure the information from the 
parties to the main proceedings, from the Commission and, sometimes, from the 
government of the Member State concerned. Such information is intended to provide 
better knowledge of the facts of the case, of the relevant national legislation or of the 
technical matters involved in certain cases. In most cases, the parties are asked to 
reply in writing, before the hearing; on occasion, it is merely suggested that they 
should deal in detail with certain questions at the hearing. 
When the preparatory phase is concluded, the case is called for hearing and all the 
parties who are entitled under the Statute to submit written observations have the 
right to present oral argument. On occasion the Court specifically asks a party to 
attend the hearing and explain certain matters, if that party has not lodged obser-
vations. Normally, the parties to the main proceedings are represented by the lawyers 
acting for them before the national court. The Court finds their contribution very 
valuable, since they are well acquainted with the background of the case and it is they 
who will ultimately be able to clarify matters for the national court, in the final stage 
of the proceedings. In that connection, there is a special provision in Article 104 (2) 
of the Rules of Procedure, by virtue of which the Court is to take account of the 
rules of procedure of the national court or tribunal which made the reference as 
regards the representation and attendance of the parties to the main proceedings. 
Although in other proceedings a party can be represented only by a lawyer entitled to 
practice before a court of a Member State, in preliminary-ruling proceedings the 
Court accepts other representatives and even allows the parties to represent them-
selves where that is permitted before the national courts, as is the case for example in 
commercial or social matters. 
In this context special mention should be made of the participation in the proceedings 
of the governments of the Member States and the Commission. The extent to which 
governments take part varies, but experience has shown that in the more important 
cases several governments always show their interest by putting forward their views. 
This applies particularly to the government of the Member State to which the court 
requesting a ruling belongs. Often, the government participates jointly with the natio-
nal administration concerned (for example, the revenue or customs authorities, the 
agricultural intervention agency, and so forth) but there is no requirement for this; 
frequently, the administrations in question submit observations in their own name, 
and the same applies to the regional authorities, such as the German Lander, the 
French departements and the municipal administrations. The Commission submits 
written and oral observations as a matter of course in all preliminary-ruling proceed-
ings, through its Legal Department, assisted by the Directorate-General within whose 
area of responsibility the matter falls. It must be acknowledged that the Com-
mission's participation is of inestimable value to the Court, since it ensures that 
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objective views are expressed on the case, often supported by research into compara-
tive law and the opinions of experts. Consequently, in that respect the Court of Justi-
ce in general has much better access to information than the national courts. Thus, 
by virtue of the preliminary-ruling procedure, the national courts obtain information 
which would otherwise not be available to them. 
A comment is called for at this stage on the languages used in proceedings before the 
Court. The national courts submit their references to the Court of Justice in their 
own national language; that language is also the language of the case. The proceed-
ings are then conducted in the language of the national court and it is the version of 
the Court's judgment in that language which will be the authentic version. However, 
the goverments of the Member States may present their observations and submissions 
in their own languages; it is then Court's responsiblility to arrange for all the docu-
ments and oral statements to be translated into the language of the case, so that they 
can be understood by the parties to the main proceedings. 
The latter remark calls for an observation on the duration of preliminary-ruling 
proceedings, which is an essential factor in the proper conduct thereof. Even disre-
garding the sometimes long period which elapses before the national courts send their 
orders for reference to the Court, the duration of the proceedings before the Court is 
determined by the following: the time required for translation of the order for 
reference; the time allowed for the submission of written observations, for which a 
mandatory time-limit is laid down in the Statute; preparation of the file by the 
judge-rapporteur and discussion at an administrative meeting; the time required for 
any information to be obtained; the period which elapses before the case can be 
heard and the time required by the advocate-general to prepare and deliver his 
opinion; and, finally, the time required for deliberation. The Court is aware that, as 
long as the preliminary-ruling proceedings go on, the proceedings before the national 
court are at a standstill. It therefore constantly endeavours to expedite the procedure 
as far as possible. In the past, it was usually able to avoid taking longer than nine 
months; at present, as a result of an excessive work load and the growing complexity 
of cases, a period of one year is a more realistic forecast. 
(c) The Court gives its decision on the questions submitted to it in the form of a 
judgment. In other words, it is a definitive judicial pronouncement which becomes 
part of the proceedings before the national court; its consequences will be considered 
shortly. 
I should first like to illustrate the typical structure of a judgment in preliminary-
ruling proceedings. The judgment is in two major parts: the first part, which is en-
titled 'facts and issues', describes the subject-matter of the dispute and the procedural 
background, with a fairly precise synthesis of the arguments put forward by the 
various parties. National courts should bear in mind that that part of the judgment, 
which has not been the subject of deliberation, is purely descriptive and cannot there-
fore be regarded as expressing the views of the Court. The Court's reasoning is 
contained in the second part of the judgment, entitled 'decision'. In that part, the 
Court usually briefly outlines the subject-matter of the case; then it describes the 
relevant legal provisions and the background to the proceedings in order to indicate 
the scope of the question or questions submitted for a preliminary ruling. The present 
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practice is to set out the questions in extenso. There then follows the actual reasoning 
of the judgment, where the Court analyses the legal problems raised and finally 
reaches specific conclusions as to how the question or questions submitted are to be 
answered. Those answers are set out again in the operative part of the judgment. 
In practice, however, the position is much less straightforward. 
On occasion the Court finds it difficult to understand questions which have not been 
properly expressed. Some questions are too complicated or too numerous or too 
theoretical, whilst others relate to the application or validity of national legislation 
rather than the interpretation of Community law. What ought to be done in such 
situations? When faced with such difficulties, the Court invariably adopts a friendly 
and constructive approach. The aim of the procedure is to provide the national court 
with a reply which will enable it to give a useful and fair judgment in the proceedings 
before it; at the same time, the Court must be careful not to exceed its jurisdiction, 
even if it is invited to do so, by ruling on questions concerning the application of 
national law. So far, it has always been possible to deal satisfactorily with such situa-
tions. In such cases the Court, allowing itself a degree of freedom, endeavours to re-
formulate questions which are poorly expressed, to group excessively numerous 
questions by reference to the basic ideas which underlie them, to establish an order of 
priority as between the questions if the national court has not done so itself, and to 
change that order where to do so seems helpful in formulating the answers. 
If, despite such efforts, the Court were still unable to understand what was asked of 
it, a remedy would still be available: if the national court is not satisfied with the 
answer given, it is always entitled to seek a further ruling from the Court. This of 
course involves a certain delay, but there are examples where courts have successfully 
followed that procedure. 30 
On the other hand, what the Court has never tolerated are efforts by private parties, 
and sometimes certain governments, to persuade the Court to disregard certain ques-
tions or change them in a manner contrary to the intentions of the national court . 31 
Of course, certain questions raised by courts may be embarrassing for one or other of 
the parties or even for certain Member States, particularly the State in which the 
court is situated. However, the Court of Justice has never concurred in any manoeuv-
res intended to suppress embarrassing questions; it has always ensured that there is 
respect for the fundamental characteristic of the preliminary-ruling procedure, which 
is, as I have said, a procedure between courts designed to permit free discussion of all 
the problems of Community law which the national court considers relevant to the 
decision to be given in the proceedings before it. 
Effects of preliminary rulings 
As soon as the preliminary ruling has been given, the judgment containing it is noti-
fied to the national court; copies are sent to the parties to the main proceedings. The 
operative part is published in the Official Journal and the complete judgment will ap-
pear subsequently in the Reports of Cases before the Court. What is the effect of the 
judgment? Let us first consider the procedural context in which it is delivered, before 
addressing ourselves to the question of its effect vis-a-vis third parties. 
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(a) As far as the national court and the parties to the main proceedings are con-
cerned, the judgment of the Court of Justice is a legal pronouncement. The pre-
liminary ruling binds the national court; contrary to a view which is still sometimes 
encountered, it is not merely an opinion. Under Article 177 the Court gives a 'ruling' 
on a question of Community law, for which it has exclusive jurisdiction; its decision 
therefore has the force of res judicata. 32 
Sometimes, the Court nevertheless leaves certain questions open so that they may be 
considered and resolved by the national court. Thus, where certain facts or articles 
are to be classified in accordance with Community law, the Court usually states that 
the specific assessments involved in such a classification are a matter for the national 
court. 33 Sometimes, as a result of inadequate information on the substance of the 
case, the Court is able to reply only by way of hypotheses or alternatives; in such 
cases, it is for the national court to choose between the possible solutions. Where the 
validity of a national law or regulation depends upon the interpretation of Com-
munity law, it is once again the responsibility of the national court to draw the 
necessary conclusions; the Court of Justice may provide the national court with the 
criteria for its decision, but it is not entitled to rule on a question falling within the 
province of national law. Thus, the answer given by the Court of Justice may allow 
the national court a varying degree of latitude, within which it must give its decision 
in accordance with the spirit of cooperation which is at the heart of the preliminary-
ruling procedure. 
Of course, the Court has a very great interest in being informed of the consequences 
of the preliminary rulings which it has given. It is important for the Court to ascer-
tain that its decision has been understood and correctly implemented; it is also impor-
tant for the Court to be aware of the difficulties which the 'follow-up' of its 
judgments may entail. That is why, when it sends its judgment to the national court, 
it asks that court to inform it of its final decision as soon as it is given. That decision 
is carefully studied and the Court prepares a note on it which is distributed to all the 
Members of the Court. On the basis of the information thus received, it may be said 
that in general the judgments of the Court are properly understood by the national 
courts and that the national courts endeavour to implement them faithfully, some-
times in the face of objections raised by one of the parties or by the public adminis-
tration, who may be dissatisfied with the decision given by the Court. In those cases 
where the Court has allowed the national court a margin of discretion, it has been 
seen that that discretion is in general exercised in a reasonable manner. Only in 
wholly exceptional cases have national courts misunderstood the rulings or showed 
reluctance to implement them. 34 
A special problem arises where a preliminary ruling has been sought at first instance 
or on appeal and where the case subsequently continues on its way through the hier-
archy of national courts. Is an appeal court or other review court bound by a prelimi-
nary ruling given at an earlier stage in the same proceedings? The answer must be yes, 
since the purpose of a preliminary ruling is to determine a question of law as between 
the parties. But, of course, the superior court is always entitled to seek a further ru-
ling from the Court if it considers that the question is to be seen in a new light, after 
being discussed in greater detail in the course of the progress of the case from one 
court to another. 
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(b) As a judicial decision which is closely linked to the particular facts of the case, a 
preliminary ruling is subject to the principle known as 'the relative effects of 
judgments' or the effect inter partes. However, at the same time it must not be for-
gotten that every preliminary ruling constitutes a precedent by virtue of the fact that 
the proceedings are concerned with purely legal questions and involve extremely wide-
ranging discussion; as has been seen, in addition to the parties to the main proceed-
ings, the governments of Member States, the Commission and, in some cases, the 
Council take part in them. It is scarcely conceivable that a decision of the Court, 
adopted on the basis of such extensive information and designed, specifically, to en-
sure unity of the law within the Community, could be easily challenged. That applies 
particularly to judgments in which the Court has declared a measure adopted by an 
institution to be void, since it is hardly conceivable that a measure, having once been 
declared void, could subsequently be reinstated. 35 But there is always a possibility that 
decisions taken in the past may subsequently be questioned with a view to obtaining 
clarifications and adjustments. That is, indeed, the essence of the process of develop-
ment of case-law, which is added to progressively and reshaped successively. It may 
therefore be said, without thereby detracting from the authority which preliminary 
rulings given have as precedents, that they are not effective erga omnes in the formal 
sense of the term. However, by virtue of considerations of legal certainty, the pre-
liminary rulings of the Court enjoy great stability. 
We have already seen one consequence of this authority as a precedent, namely that 
concerning the scope of the obligation imposed by the third paragraph of Article 177 
upon supreme courts. The Court has acknowledged that where a question concerning 
a point of law which is identical or similar to one which has already been dealt with 
by the Court arises in proceedings before a supreme court, it is released from its 
obligation to request a ruling, in the sense that it is faced with a choice: it either 
considers that the problem raised has already been resolved by the Court and that all 
it need do is to follow an existing decision; in that case, it is released from its obli-
gation to seek a ruling. Or else it considers that the question, in the form in which it 
has arisen, involves new aspects or calls for reconsideration; in such a case, like any 
other court, it is always entitled to seek a ruling from the Court of Justice. 
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Part 3: Problems and difficulties of the 
preliminary-ruling procedure 
Whilst it is true that the functioning of the preliminary-ruling procedure and its re-
sults may be regarded as highly satisfactory, the fact nevertheless remains that the 
Court of Justice and the national courts have encountered all sorts of problems and 
difficulties along the way. There have been and still are misunderstandings, there 
have been attempts to misuse the procedure, there have been and still are conflicts, 
sometimes below the surface and sometimes out in the open, particularly with regard 
to the obligation imposed on courts of last instance by the third paragraph of Article 
177. In other words, there is a pathological aspect of the preliminary-ruling pro-
cedure, in addition to its normal physiology. It will be described here in part three, 
but not merely for the sake of the description. In fact, the judgments which the Court 
has been called upon to give over the years in this context may not perhaps always 
have had the same scope as other judgments given on the same subject, in so far as 
the Court, having been, so to speak, driven into a corner by certain ill-conceived ini-
tiatives, has had to react to situations involving varying degrees of embarrassment. 
For that reason, it is wrong to be too hasty in drawing peremptory conclusions from 
decisions adopted in unusual circumstances of that kind. This preliminary comment 
will be better understood when the details given below are considered. 
Who can seek a preliminary ruling from the Court? 
Article 177 confers the right to seek a ruling upon the 'courts and tribunals of the 
Member States'. Normally, that description does not arouse any doubts, but there 
have been borderline cases capable of giving rise to dissension. 
(a) There are, in the first place, judges or courts which carry out functions which 
are not strictly judicial in nature. That is so, for example, in the case of an Italian 
judge, who in certain circumstances can issue injunctions against the administration 
even before the procedure has reached the actual litigation stage; there is also the 
more general case of judges sitting in interlocutory proceedings, who have authority 
to adopt provisional measures but cannot deal with the substance of the case; there 
are judges whose functions may be described as those of judicial administration, such 
as judges who supervise the keeping of certain registers and judges who supervise the 
liquidation of insolvent companies; the same applies to examining magistrates, who 
are responsible for investigating cases and not for adjudicating upon them. In cases 
of that kind, the Court has invariably taken what may be referred to as an 'organic' 
approach: if the person or body in question has a public mandate and gives judgment 
by virtue of jurisidiction conferred upon it by law in the general interest, that person 
or body is a court or tribunal of a Member State within the meaning of Article 177. It 
is each Member State which must determine the manner in which its courts are to 
operate and organize the performance of judicial functions in successive phases, some 
of which may be provisional or preparatory rather than leading to a definitive 
judicial pronouncement. Where a problem of Community law arises at one of those 
preliminary procedural stages, there is no reason why a reference should not be made 
to the Court_36 
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(b) A second problem, which is more difficult than the first one, is that of quasi-
judicial or arbitration bodies which operate in the social, professional and commer-
cial fields. Here, the following principle clearly emerges from the Court's decision: 
where an arbitral body is set up by law, has a public mandate and has jurisdiction to 
which parties must submit, it is a court or tribunal within the meaning of Article 177. 
That applies in particular to the many judicial bodies which operate, in the em-
ployment and social-security fields, on a joint basis, that is to say under the responsi-
bility of the State, but with the assistance of judges or arbitrators representing the 
various professional spheres.37 
On the other hand, bodies constituted within independent professions, such as gover-
ning councils of lawyers, doctors or other professional people, do not have the stan-
ding of a court or tribunal. 38 The same applies to private arbitration, since even if an 
arbitration award is binding upon the parties, the appointment of the arbitrators is a 
matter of contractual autonomy between private parties. 39 The preliminary-ruling 
procedure could only come into play at the stage where the decisions of professional 
bodies or private arbitrators are submitted for review by a public court or tribunal. 
National law and Communtiy law; 'application' and 'interpretation' 
Behind these two twofold expressions lie rather difficult problems of delimitation 
which have been encountered in practice. 
(a) Often, questions of Community law are raised by national courts to enable them 
to determine the meaning or assess the scope or validity of a national law. Thus, for 
example, cases may concern the interpretation of a national law harmonized pursuant 
to a Community directive, or resolution of a conflict between a tax law and the rules 
of the Treaty on the free movement of goods, or consideration of the compatibility 
of a law on the control of aliens with the freedom of entry and residence guaranteed 
to Community nationals. In such situations, national courts sometimes ask the Court 
of Justice to indicate how a national law must be interpreted or to pronounce upon 
the validity of a law which appears to be contrary to Community law. When confron-
ted with such questions, the Court has always responded by saying that it is not the 
Court's role to rule on the interpretation, scope or validity of national legislation. Its 
role is to provide the national court with criteria for interpretation based on Com-
munity law, enabling it to resolve problems of interpretation or validity arising in the 
application of its domestic law. 
Despite this cautious approach by the Court, it must be acknowledged that a signifi-
cant proportion of requests for preliminary rulings are very closely related to actions 
for a declaration that a State has failed to fulfil its obligations. This comparison was 
indeed drawn by certain goverments which, in the well-known case of Van Gend & 
Loos, contended that the questions submitted for a preliminary-ruling by the national 
court to enable it to appraise the validity of a national legal provision were 
inadmissible; according to those governments, only the procedure provided for by 
Articles 169 and 170 of the EEC Treaty could be used for that purpose. In reply to 
that argument, the Court emphasized that the fact that such an action against a 
Member State is pending certainly does not prevent a private individual from 
26 
claiming before a national court that a Member State has failed to fulfil its obliga-
tions under Community law. It follows that the national court is entitled to submit to 
the Court of Justice any questions which it regards as relevant where there may be a 
conflict between Community law and national law. 40 That position has not been 
questioned since and thus the preliminary-ruling procedure has come to be, inter alia, 
the 'individual's remedy for a State's failure to fulfil its obligations'; it is not unusual 
for the Court to have before it, at the same time, actions for failure by a Member 
State to fulfil its obligations and requests for preliminary rulings relating to the same 
subject-matter. 
(b) More difficult to grasp is the distinction drawn between the 'application' and 
the 'interpretation' of Community law. It is a distinction drawn by the Treaty, which 
empowers the Court only to resolve questions of 'interpretation' of Community law; 
that which remains is therefore a matter for the national court - but what in fact 
does remain? It is difficult methodically to separate these two closely-linked phases 
whereby the law is put into effect. In the past, an attempt was made to deal with the 
problem by saying that all the Court needed to do was to give 'abstract' inter-
pretations on questions of law, expressed in general terms. However it was long since 
acknowledged that reasoning of that kind produces no useful result. In the light of 
experience, the view has developed that interpretation marks an intermediate, but 
nevertheless decisive, stage in the process whereby Community law is applied by the 
national courts. To say that it is an intermediate stage implies that there is something 
'before' and something 'afterwards'. This requires further examination. 
Before: I have already stated that it is of the utmost benefit to the Court to have the 
fullest possible knowledge of the specific circumstances of the case referred to it, to 
enable it to appreciate the background of fact and of national law against which its 
interpretation is to be given. The quality of the answers given by the Court is directly 
influenced by the care taken by the national court in preparing the file to be sent to 
the Court. 
Afterwards: once the interpretation has been given, an important task still remains 
for the national court. Often the answer may be rather nuanced, and on occasion it 
may leave open questions of qualification or of appreciation to be solved by the 
national court. The duty remaining to be discharged by the national court is far 
removed from the mere activation of an automatic mechanism. 
It will be seen therefore that the concepts of application and interpretation, rather 
than defining areas of jurisdiction, refer to successive stages in a process of im-
plementing the law in which two courts - the national court and the Community 
Court - take part one after the other, each responsible for discharging its specific 
function: it is for one of them to decide the dispute and it is for the other to ensure 
that in the decision disposing of the dispute Community law is duly observed. 41 
Failure by the national court in its duty to request a ruling 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the Court has acknowledged that national 
courts which are subject to the obligation laid down in the third paragraph of Article 
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177 have a reasonable margin of discretion with respect to the need to seek a prelimi-
nary ruling from the Court. Like any other court, a supreme court is free to assess 
the pertinence of the question. It is also responsible for deciding whether the question 
raised has already been resolved in existing decisions of the Court of Justice. It may 
even, if it considers that every other court in the Community would act in like 
fashion, decide that it is not required to submit to the Court a question which, in its 
view, does not, according to objective criteria, raise any reasonable doubt. It has 
been seen that the Court has based its views in this matter on the principle of sincere 
and forthright cooperation with the national courts, with a view to safeguarding the 
unity of Community law. 
However, experience has shown that that has not always been the attitude adopted by 
the courts of the Member States. Certain courts, dealing with problems which mani-
festly involve the interpretation of Community law and even the efficacy thereof, 
have 'forgotten' to request preliminary rulings on questions which, objectively, call 
for an answer. In certain cases, to justify their attitude, courts have had recourse to 
the acte clair doctrine, claiming that their views- which, in certain cases, related to 
notoriously obscure rules or which were in open conflict with previous decisions of 
the Court - followed, without the slightest doubt, either from the text of the Treaty 
or from the lack of express provisions. Recourse to such an approach is, in fact, 
merely a cloak for the resistance on the part of certain highly placed courts to the 
authority of Community law, or for their desire not to give the Court an opportunity 
to clarify certain problems.42 
Such attitudes are greatly to be regretted since they reflect a lack of confidence in the 
Court, a refusal to engage in dialogue and even, on some occasions, a refusal to 
acknowledge the consequences of the creation of the European Communities. There 
is no doubt that the taking of such liberties by national courts to evade the obligation 
imposed upon them by the third paragraph of Article 177 could be the subject of 
proceedings by the Commission for failure by a Member State to fulfil its obligations 
under the Treaty; it should be noted, however, that although it has considered this 
idea on certain occasions, the Commission has never so far chosen to react in that 
way.43 
On the other hand, attitudes of that kind on the part of national courts of last 
instance entail another risk, and a very real risk, for those courts themselves. It is 
possible and has indeed happened on more than one occasion that where a court of a 
Member State has neglected its duty to seek a ruling from the Court on questions 
which objectively required an answer, a court in another Member State or even an 
inferior court in the same State has taken it upon itself to seek a ruling on those 
questions.44 Thus, the problem which it was sought to circumvent is nevertheless 
brought before the Court and resolved. Eventually, courts which refuse to cooperate 
with the Court of Justice are thus placed in an isolated position; it is unlikely that in 
the long-term they will be able to prevent themselves from being overtaken by the tide 
of legal cooperation extending throughout the European Community. Thus, the 
resistance just described will prove in reality to be no more than a rearguard action; 
progress in legal integration and the weathering of time will ultimately prevail. It 
would appear, therefore, unnecessary to be over-concerned about these isolated 
occurrences. 
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Abusive questions 
From time to time, either through ignorance or intentionally, parties and even judges 
endeavour to abuse the preliminary-ruling procedure by making it serve ends other 
than those for which it was created. In certain cases, fictitious proceedings have been 
contrived solely for the purpose of obtaining a preliminary ruling from the Court. 45 
Here, a distinction must however be drawn between entirely fictitious proceedings, 
that is to say those which are an entire fabrication and in which there is no real 
dispute, and those which constitute test cases, that is to say genuine proceedings, 
instituted in some cases with respect to a minor matter, so as to put a legal rule to the 
test and to obtain a ruling thereon.46 That distinction having been drawn, it must be 
stated that the Court's attitude has, in general, been rather tolerant regarding proce-
dural manoeuvres devoid of real substance and it has given answers even in cases 
where the genuineness of the dispute might appear dubious. It has been concerned 
not to discourage those courts which wish to refer serious problems to it. 
Another case of error or abuse is represented by questions that bear no relation to 
Community law and therefore manifestly fall outside the competence of the Court, 
which, by virtue of Article 177, has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings only on 
the interpretation of the Treaty or rules of secondary law. In certain cases, the Court 
has dismissed such requests as manifestly inadmissible; in other cases, it has taken the 
trouble to explain the scope and limits of Community law to the national court which 
made the inappropriate request, indicating that Community law does not cover mat-
ters which are purely internal to a Member State.47 
Finally, there have been instances where the Court has been asked to rule on ques-
tions of a political nature which, as such, are not a matter for legal proceedings.48 
Here also the problem arises as to whether such questions should be declared inad-
missible or whether the trouble should be taken to explain to the referring court why 
the Court of Justice is unable to answer its question. 
Initiatives of this kind are regrettable since, because of their ignorance or their 
cavalier approach, the national courts thereby place the Court of Justice in embar-
rassing situations, forcing it to react in one of two ways: either to give a semblance of 
replying seriously to questions with no real substance, which might detract from its 
moral authority; or to react defensively, thereby giving the impression that it wishes 
to restrict references from national courts. Thus, in one case which has become no-
torious because of the obstinancy of a national court, the Court emphasized that the 
proper functioning of the preliminary-ruling procedure calls for mutual respect and 
that the procedure cannot operate unless the national court, too, evinces at least some 
understanding of the responsibility which the Court must assume in such matters in 
the interests of the Community as a whole. 49 
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Notes 
Article 100 (1) of the German Basic law of 23 May 1949 provides as follows: 'If a court con-
siders unconstitutional a law, the validity of which is relevant to its decision, the proceedings 
shall be stayed . . . and a decision shall be obtained from . . . the Federal Constitutional 
Court'. Article 134 of the Italian Constitution of 27 December 1947 reserves to the 
Constitutional Court, inter alia, proceedings relating to the 'constitutionality' of the laws of 
the State. Article 1 of Constitutional Law No 1 of 9 February 1948 provides as follows: 
'Any question regarding the 'constitutionality' of a law or a measure having the force of a 
law of the Republic which is raised of the court's own motion or by any party to proceedings 
and is not considered by the court to be manifestly without foundation shall be referred to 
the Constitutional Court for a decision'. Article 161 of the Spanish Constitution of 27 
December 1978 confers jurisdiction upon the Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) 
to deal, inter alia, with 'actions to establish the unconstitutionality of laws and legislative 
provisions having force of law'. Articles 35 to 37 of the Organic Law of 3 October 1979 
contain detailed provisions governing the procedure for requests for rulings by the courts. 
Article 35 (1) provides in that connection as follows: 'Where a court, of its own motion or in 
response to the submissions of a party, considers that a rule having the force of law which is 
applicable to the case and upon whose validity the decision depends may be contrary to the 
constitution, it shall refer the matter to the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the 
provisions of the present law. All these procedures are of a type involving an 'appraisal of 
validity'. Apparently, no example exists of preliminary requests for interpretation, which 
therefore would appear to be an invention of the authors of the EEC Treaty. 
2 Judgment of 17 May 1983, Case 168/82, European Coal and Steel Community Liquidator 
of Ferriere Sant'Anna SpA, [1983] ECR 1681. 
3 According to that Protocol, the right to request a preliminary ruling is available to appeal 
courts and courts superior thereto. In the case of supreme courts, a preliminary ruling must 
be requested. A similar protocol, dated 3 June 1971, was added to the Convention of 29 
February 1968 on the mutual recognition of companies and legal persons. 
4 Thus, the Court is often approached with regard to the interpretation of the Sixth Directive 
on harmonization of the laws on VAT, to enable the competent courts to ensure that their 
national legislation is in harmony with the directive. See, for example, the judgment of 4 
July 1985 in Case 168/84 Berkholz. With respect to national measures not in conformity 
with the directive, see the judgment of 6 October 1970 in Case 9170, Grad v Finanzamt 
Traunstein, [1970] ECR 825, on the interpretation and effect of a Council decision, and the 
judgment of 19 January 1982 in Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Munster, [1982] 
ECR 53, on the interpretation and effect of a directive. 
5 A particularly striking illustration is to be found in the judgment of 5 April 1979 in Case 
148/78, Tullio Ratti, [1979] ECR 1629, concerning criminal proceedings in Italy against a 
manufacturer of solvents who had adapted the packaging of his goods to the requirements 
of a Community directive which the Italian State had not implemented within the prescribed 
period. The Court held that 'a Member State may not apply its internal law - even if it is 
provided with penal sanctions - which has not yet been adapted in compliance with the 
directive to a person who has complied with the requirement of the directive'. 
6 The judgment of 30 April1974 in Case 181173, Haegman, [1974] ECR 449 contains a ruling 
to that effect. 
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7 This question was dealt with for the first time in the judgment of 12 December 1972 in 
Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company NV, [1972] ECR 1219. That 
decision was confirmed by the judgments of 16 March 1983 in Case 266/81, SlOT, [1983] 
ECR 731, and SPI and Michelin, Joined Cases 267 to 269/81, [1983] ECR 801. In the latter 
judgment, regarding the application of GATT, the Court stated that 'the provisions of 
GATT should, like the provisions of all other agreements binding the Community, receive 
uniform application throughout the Community' (paragraph 14). 
8 The safeguards regarding fundamental rights were laid down principally in two preliminary 
rulings: the judgment of 17 December 1970 in Case 11/70, lnternationale Handelsge-
sellschajt, [1970] ECR 1125, in which the Court stated that 'respect for fundamental rights 
forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice' (pa-
ragraph 4) and the judgment of 13 December 1979 in Case 44/79, Lieselotte Hauer, [1979] 
ECR 3727, in which the Court's doctrine is fully developed. As regards the general principles 
applicable in administrative law, see the judgments of 27 September 1979 in Case 230/78, 
Eridania, [1979] ECR 2749 (respect for acquired rights), of 16 May 1979 in Case 84/78, To-
madini, [1979] ECR 1801 (protection of legitimate expectations), of 15 February 1978 in 
Case 96/77 Bouche, [1978] ECR 383 (principle of non-retroactivity), of 12 October 1978 in 
Case 10/78 Tayeb Belbouab, [1978] ECR 1915, of 25 January 1979, in Case 98/78, Rocke, 
[1978] ECR 69, and Case 99/78, Decker, [1979] ECR 101 (legal certainty), and of 21 June 
1979 in Case 240/78, Atalanta, [1979] ECR 2137 (principle of proportionality). In its 
judgment of 11 May 1983 in Case 87/82, Rogers v Darthenay, [1983] ECR 1579, the Court 
of Justice laid down guidelines for the national court as to how lacunae in the Community 
rules on technical measures for the conservation of fishery resources should be filled. 
9 The following may be cited by way of example: the judgment of 8 October 1980 in Case 
810/79 Oberschaer, [1980] ECR 2747, in the operative part of which it is stated that consid-
eration of the provisions of Regulation No 1408/71 on social security, as interpreted in the 
judgment, disclosed no factors of such a nature as to call in question the validity thereof; the 
judgment of 5 May 1982 in Case 15/81, Schul, [1982] ECR 1409, in the operative part of 
which it is stated that the contested provision of the Sixth VAT Directive is valid since it 
must be interpreted in a certain way; the judgment of 17 November 1983 in Case 292/82, 
Merck, [1983] ECR 3781, in which the Court stated in the grounds of the decision that, in 
view of the interpretation to be given to the contested provisions, the questions concerning 
the validity thereof had become devoid of purpose. 
10 Following the discussions provoked by a previous judgment (of 15 October 1980 in Case 
145/79, Roquette freres, [1980] ECR 2917), the Court expressly reaffirmed its position on 
this matter in its judgment of 27 February 1985 in Case 112/83, Societe des Produits de 
Mais, emphasizing that determiniation of the effect in time of a finding of invalidity falls 
within the powers reserved to the Court in the interests of uniform application of Commu-
nity law. 
11 In its judgment of 20 February 1979 in Case 122/78, Buitoni, [1979] ECR 677, the Court 
held that conditions involving forfeiture of a security were invalid, because they were in 
breach of the principle of proportionality. In its judgment of 17 December 1970 in Case 
11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125, the Court considered the 
validity of Community rules in relation to the safeguarding of fundamental rights. The 
judgment of 12 December 1972 in Joined Cases 21 to 24/72, International Fruit Company 
NV, [1972] ECR 1219 concerns review of the validity of measures adopted by the institutions 
in the light of certain provisions of international law. 
12 Case 16/65, [1965] ECR 877. The same ideas are set out, with greater emphasis on there-
ciprocal nature of the obligations, in the judgment of 16 December 1981 in Case 244/80, 
Foglia v. Novello (II), [1981] ECR 3045, to which I shall refer again in the third part. 
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13 The well-known judgments of 5 February 1963 in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, [1963] 
ECR 1; of 14 July 1964 in Case 6/64, Costa v Enel [1964] ECR 614; of 9 March 1978 inCa-
se 106177, Simmenthal, [1978] ECR 629, on the direct effect and primacy of Community 
law, are all preliminary rulings. So is the judgment of 17 December 1970 in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, supra, which laid down the bases for the protection of fundamental 
rights under Community law; the judgment of 20 February 1979 in Case 120178, Rewe, 
[1979] ECR 649, better known as the 'Cassis de Dijon' case, which removed considerable 
barriers to the free movement of goods. 
14 In its judgment of 6 October 1982 in Case 283/81 Ci/fit, [1982], ECR 3415, the Court ex-
pressly recognized that questions may be submitted on the referring court's own initiative 
(paragraph 9 of the decision). 
15 The Court has repeatedly placed emphasis on this freedom of the national courts. Particu-
larly expressive statements to that effect are to be found in the judgments of 16 January 
1974 in Case 166173, Rheinmiihlen, [1974] ECR 33, regarding the freedom of appraisal of a 
court giving judgment in a case sent back to it by a superior court; of 29 November 1978 in 
Case 83178, Pigs Marketing Board, [1978] ECR 2347; of 16 December 1981 in Foglia v 
Novello (II), supra. I shall come back to these decisions later. 
16 In its very first preliminary ruling, on 6 April1962 in Case 13/61, Bosch, [1962] ECR 45, of 
6 April 1962, the Court ruled that the Treaty does not lay down the form in which the natio-
nal court must submit its request for a ruling and added that the 'national court is free to 
put its request in a simple and direct form', leaving it to the Court of Justice to rule on that 
request within the limits of its jurisdiction. 
17 That is more or less what the Tribunal d' Arrondissement, Luxembourg, asked the Court to 
do in the so-called 'Port de Mertert' case. In its judgment of 14 July 1971 in Case 10171, Mi-
nistere Public v Madeleine Muller, [1971] ECR 723, the Court first identified the subject-
matter of the question - the interpretation of Article 90 of the EEC Treaty - and then re-
plied to the question thus framed. 
18 See, for example, the questions submitted by the Italian Corte di Cassazione in the SlOT 
case (Case 266/81, [1983] ECR 731), with which the Court struggled in its judgment of 16 
March 1983. 
19 In the Adoui and Cornouail/e case, concerning the expulsion of two prostitutes from Bel-
gium, the President of the Tribunal de Premiere Instance, Liege, submitted two sets of 14 
and 15 questions, several of which were double or multiple, giving a total of some 40 ques-
tions. In its judgment of 18 May 1982 in Joined Cases 115 and 116/82, [1982] ECR 1665, the 
Court endeavours to deal with them in an orderly fashion. 
20 Thus, in its abovementioned judgment of 17 December 1970 in Case 11170, Internationale 
Hande/sgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125, the Court took care to describe the position adopted 
by the national court, the Verwaltungsgericht Frankfurt, which in that case was of particular 
importance to resolution of the problem raised. 
21 In its judgment of 10 March 1981 in Joined Cases 36 and 71/80, Irish Creamery Milk Supp-
liers' Association, [1981] ECR 735, the Court stated in that connetion: 'The need to provide 
an interpretation ... which will be of use to the national court makes it essential ... to define 
the legal context in which the interpretation requested should be placed. From that aspect it 
might be convenient, in certain circumstances, for the facts of the case to be established and 
for questions of purely national law to be settled at the time the reference is made to the 
Court of Justice so as to enable the latter to take cognizance of all the features of fact and 
of law which may be relevant to the interpretation of Community law which it is called upon 
to give' (paragraph 6 of the decision). 
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22 A typical example of such a situation is provided by Case 218/83, Les Rapides Savoyards, in 
which a customs case went laboriously from court to court over a period of six years before 
reaching the Cour de Cassation, which finally took the view that a preliminary ruling should 
be sought from the Court. The Commission then showed, in its observations, that all the 
courts, including the supreme court, had been discussing the wrong problem. The judgment 
of the Court of 12 July 1984 places the problem- which concerned the interpretation of the 
EEC/Swiss free trade agreement - in its proper context and adopts a solution which falls 
entirely outside the terms of reference within which it had previously been discussed. A 
reference at first instance could have avoided this long-lasting misunderstanding. 
23 This does not necessarily mean a single court. A division of jurisdiction between the 
'ordinary' courts and the administrative courts is fairly widespread. The Federal Republic of 
Germany even has, in addition to the Bundesgerichtshof, four other supreme courts for 
administrative cases, financial cases, employment cases and social security cases. In Van 
Gend & Loos the Court was asked for a ruling by a Netherlands customs court which is a 
court of first and last instance, the Tariefcommissie. 
24 The Court expressly so ruled in its judgment of 6 October 1982 in Cilfit, supra (paragraph 
10). 
25 Joined Cases 28 to 30/62, [1963] ECR 31. It should be noted that, whilst the Da Costa en 
Schaake judgment requires the question already dealt with to be 'materially identical', the 
Cilfit judgment adopts a wider criterion: it is sufficient if 'previous decisions of the Court 
have already dealt with the point of law in question ... even though the questions at issue are 
not strictly identical' (paragraph 14). 
26 Since this judgment summarizes the Court's doctrine on the interpretation of Article 177 
itself, I have included the essential passages in an annex. 
27 Case 83178, [1978] ECR 2347, paragraphs 25 and 26. 
28 Rulings to this effect are to be found in the following decisions: judgment of 14 December 
1962 in Joined Cases 31 and 33/62, Wohrman, [1962] ECR 501; order of 3 June 1964 in 
Case 6/64, Costa v Enel, [1964] ECR 614; judgment of 9 December 1965 in Case 44/65, 
Hessische Knappschaft, [1965] ECR 965. 
29 See on this subject the judgments of 30 January 1974 in Case 127173, Sabam, [1974] ECR 51 
('the procedure ... continues as long as the request of the national court has neither been 
withdrawn nor become devoid of object') and of 6 October 1983, in Joined Cases 2 to 4/82 
Delhaize, [1983] ECR 2973 (refusal to take account of an appeal lodged by the Belgian Gov-
ernment). In several cases, superior courts have refused to entertain an appeal of this kind. 
Particularly significant in that respect is the attitude adopted by the Pigs Marketing Board 
case. Having received an appeal against the decision of the Resident Magistrate of Armagh, 
the Belfast court took the view 'that it was within the Magistrate's discretion to clarify the 
legal questions relating to the exercise of his own jurisdiction' (judgment of 29 November 
1978, paragraphs 16 and 17). 
30 See, for example, the judgment of 24 June 1969 in Case 29/68, Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor 
[1969] ECR 165. In that case, the Court held that interpretations given by it are binding on 
the national court which submitted the question, but that it is for that court to decide 
whether it has been sufficiently enlightened by the preliminary ruling given or whether it is 
necessary to approach the Court again. 
31 See, for example, the singular vagaries of the Pigs Marketing Board case, already cited on 
several occasions, which is typical in that respect. When the case had been considered, it be-
came apparent that the Resident Magistrate of Armagh, from whom it originated, had sub-
mitted perfectly relevant questions. 
33 
32 The Court clearly so held in its judgment of 3 February 1977 in Case 52/76, Benedetti, 
[1977] ECR 163, where it stated that 'Under Article 177 the Court of Justice has jurisdiction 
to 'give( ... ) rulings' concerning the interpretation 'of this Treaty' and that 'of acts of the in-
stitutions of the Community'. It follows that the purpose of a preliminary ruling is to decide 
a question of law and that that ruling is binding on the national court as to interpretation of 
the Community provisions and acts in question' (paragraph 26). 
33 See for example, the judgment of 31 January 1984 in Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi 
and Carbone, [1984] ECR 377, in which the Court stated that it was for the national court to 
determine whether the controls on transfers of foreign currency were in conformity with the 
limit indicated in the Court's judgment; the judgment of 28 March 1984 in Joined Cases 47 
and 48/83, Pluimveeslachterij, [1984] ECR 1721, in which the Court states that it is for the 
national court to determine whether the quality and marketing rules laid down in national 
rules are compatible with the common organization of the market in poultry; and the 
judgment of 9 July 1985 in Case 179/84, Bozzetti, in which determination of the fiscal or 
non-fiscal nature of an agricultural levy is necessary in order to enable the national court to 
decide whether it has jurisdiction. 
34 Thus, in its judgment of 15 July 1981, (Dalloz, 1982, p. 9), the Tribunal d'lnstance, Lille, 
refused to accept the judgment of the Court of 15 October 1980 (Case 145179, Roquette 
Freres, [1980] ECR 2917). The Tribunal took the view that the Court had exceeded its power 
by limiting in time the effect of a finding that a regulation was invalid. The epilogue to that 
case is to be found in the judgment of 27 February 1985, Societe des Produits de Mais, supra. 
35 This question was examined in the judgment of 13 May 1981 in Case 66/80, International 
Chemical Corp. BV, [1981] ECR 1191. 
36 See the following decisions: on 'non-contentious' jurisdiction, the judgment of 12 November 
1974 in Case 32/74, Haaga, [1974] ECR 1201; on questions submitted by an examining ma-
gistrate, the judgment of 24 April 1980 in Case 65179, Chatain, [1980] ECR 1345; on the 
question of the Italian injunction procedure, the judgment of 9 November 1983 in Case 
199/82, San Giorgio, [1983] ECR 3595, which contains references to the previous cases; on 
interlocutory proceedings, the judgments of 24 May 1977 in Case 107176, Hofmann-La 
Roche, [1977] ECR 957, and of 27 October 1982 in Joined Cases 35 and 36/82, Morson and 
Jhanjan, [1982] ECR 3723. 
37 This is apparent from the judgment of 30 June 1966 in Case 61/65, Vaasen (nee Gobbels), 
[1966] ECR 261, which defines the essential criteria: a body constituted in accordance with 
law, members appointed by the public authority, permanent body bound by rules of pro-
cedure similar to those applicable to ordinary courts of law, an obligation for the parties to 
submit to its jurisdiction and an obligation to give judgment in accordance with rules of law. 
38 In its order of 18 June 1980 in Case 138/80, Borker, [1980] ECR 1975, the Court stated that 
it had no jurisdiction to rule upon a reference from the Conseil de l'Ordre des A vocals de Ia 
Cour de Paris. Conversely, in the judgment of 6 October 1981 in Case 246/80, Broek-
meulen, [1981] ECR 2311, it accepted a question submited by the Commisie van Beroep 
Huisartsgeneeskunde, an appeal committee operating within the Netherlands Royal 
Association for the Promotion of Medicine. That was certainly a marginal case, but the 
Court found that the appeals committee in question exercised its functions with the consent 
and cooperation of the public authorities, observing the audi alteram partem principle, and 
that no other remedy was available. It therefore held that the appeals committee was a 
'court or tribunal' within the meaning of Article 177. 
39 Judgment of 23 March 1982 in Case 102/81, Nordsee, [1982] ECR 1095. According to that 
judgment, the test to determine whether a body is a court or tribunal concerns the respon-
sibility which a Member State must assume, as regards the performance of obligations 
arising from Community law under Articles 5 and 169 to 171 of the Treaty, for the decisions 
of the persons whom it has vested with judicial authority. An arbitrator appointed under a 
private contract does not satisfy that test. 
34 
40 Judgment of 5 February 1963 in Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos, [1963] ECR 1; see in parti-
cular the final part of the discussion of the first question, in which the Court states that: 
'The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective super-
vision in addition to the supervision entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the 
Commission and of the Member States'. 
41 The Court defined at a very early stage the division of functions between itself and national 
courts. In two judgments of 15 July 1964 in Case 6/64, Costa v Enel, [1964] ECR 585, and 
of 4 February 1965 in Case 20/64, Albatros, [1965] ECR 29, it stated that it had no jurisdic-
tion to apply Community law to a specific case or to rule upon the validity of provisions of 
domestic law in relation to Community law, but only to interpret the provisions of Com-
munity law having regard to the legal information provided by the national court. 
42 The French Conseil d'Etat has followed this procedure in several of its judgments over a 
considerable period: in its judgment of 19 June 1964 (Societe des Petroles Shell-Berre and 
Others, Recueil Lebon, p. 344), it interpreted Article 37 of the EEC Treaty itself, and took 
the view that there was no need to seek an interpretation of a measure which constituted an 
acte clair. In its judgment of 1 March 1968 (Syndical des Fabriquants de Semou/e, Recueil 
Lebon, p. 149), it held that a Community regulation must give way to a subsequent conflic-
ting legislative provision, without endeavouring to clarify the legal situation by recourse to 
the preliminary-ruling procedure. In its judgment of 12 December 1978 (Cohn-Bendit, 
Recueil Lebon, p. 524), it interpreted Article 189 of the EEC Treaty itself and disregarded 
the case-law of the Court as to the internal effect of directives, without seeking from the 
Court any confirmation or clarification of that case-law. In its judgment of 23 December 
1981 (Cattenom, Recueil Lebon, p. 484), on the construction of a nuclear power station near 
the frontier of two other Member States, it applied the doctrine of the acte clair to justify its 
refusal to refer to the Court a question of interpretation relating to the Euratom Treaty. In a 
decision of 16 July 1981 (Europarecht 1979, p. 442), explicitly inspired by the Cohn-Bendit 
decision, the Bundesfinanzhof refused to seek a preliminary ruling from the Court, 
considering that there was no reasonable doubt as to whether or not directives were directly 
applicable. In its decision of 25 April1985 (Europarecht 1985, p. 191), the Bundesfinanzhof, 
hearing a case in which the Court had already given a preliminary ruling in response to a 
reference from a court of first instance Oudgment of 22 February 1984 in Case 70/83, 
Kloppenburg, [1984] ECR 1075, refused to accept the decision of the Court, which had 
recognized a taxpayer's right to rely upon a Community directive to defeat a national law 
which had not been adapted within the prescribed period. 
43 The Commission brought to the notice of the German Government its grave concern regar-
ding the order of 29 May 1974 of the Federal Constitutional Court, known as the 'Solange-
BeschluB' (NJW 1974, p. 1697). The Commission stated that 'By claiming the power to 
verify the compatibility of Community secondary legislation with the fundamental rights in 
the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court is impugning the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice to ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is 
observed' (Eighth General Report, p. 297 et seq.). Similarly, the Commission informed the 
French Government of its profound concern regarding the decision of the Conseil d'Etat of 
12 December 1978 in the Cohn-Bendit case (13th General Report, p. 315). 
44 The following are two illustrations taken from the case-law of the Court. The judgment of 
26 February 1975 in Case 67174, Bonsignore, [1975] ECR 297, and the Opinion delivered on 
that occasion by Mr Advocate-General Mayras showed that the Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
had, without resorting to the preliminary-ruling procedure, delivered judgments restricting 
the freedom of residence of Community nationals on grounds of public policy and public 
security. The Verwaltungsgericht Koln, which entertained doubts as to whether, under 
Community law, those decisions were well founded, requested the Court for a preliminary 
ruling and obtained a decision favouring its more liberal view. The judgment of 27 May 
1981 in Joined Cases 142 and 143/80, Essevi and Salengo [1981] ECR 1413, shows that, on 
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the basis of a Commission decision authorizing Italy to maintain a system of taxing alcohol 
which was manifestly contrary to the principles of Community law, the Italian Corte di 
Cassazione had adopted a series of decisions which were no less dubious from the point of 
view of Community law, without resorting to the preliminary-ruling procedure. It was a 
request for a preliminary ruling by the Milan court of appeal which eventually gave the 
Court of Justice an opportunity to give a ruling on the tax system in question. 
45 The judgment of 12 July 1979 in Case 244/78, Union Laitiere Normande, [1979] ECR 2663, 
deals with a case in which a French group of agricultural cooperatives brought an action in 
France against its own United Kingdom subsidiary seeking a ruling by the French court that 
the United Kingdom rules on the sale of milk were incompatible with Community law. The 
Court of Justice responded by saying that the Treaty did not allow it to 'evaluate the 
grounds for making the reference' and gave an answer to the questions submitted which was 
evasive but showed that, on one point at least, the United Kingdom legislation was not 
without justification. The judgment of 11 March 1980 in Case 104/79, Foglia v Novello (1), 
[1980] ECR 745, delivered in response to a request by the Pretore di Bra, concerned the fol-
lowing facts: Two private individuals (a wine merchant established in Italy and his customer) 
agreed to send several cases of Italian wine to France. The contract provided that any taxes 
levied by the French authorities contrary to the rules on the free movement of goods would 
not be charged to the purchaser. On entering France, the carrier was obliged to pay excise 
duties to the French administration. The parties then engaged in proceedings before an 
Italian court concerning the compatibility of the French tax with the rules of the common 
market, making it known that they concurred in the view that the tax was unlawful; the 
judge submitted a question to the Court under Article 177. The idea was thus that the 
Community Court should evaluate the French tax system in connection with proceedings 
before an Italian court, in a case where the parties themselves were in agreement as to the 
result. The Court reacted by stating that to give a ruling in such circumstances would 
jeopardize the whole system of legal remedies and fell outside the framework of its duties. 
46 Case 112/80 Durbeck, which gave rise to the judgment of 5 May 1981, [1981] ECR 1095, 
may be cited as an example. The dispute arose in connection with the importation by air into 
Germany of two boxes of apples originating from Chile; the object was to test the validity of 
Community rules which restricted imports of apples originating in non-member countries 
with a view to the performance of a bigger contract. 
47 In its judgment of 17 December 1975 in Case 93/75, Ad/erbium, [18975] ECR 2147, the 
Court considered that it had no jurisdiction to answer a question which fell solely within the 
scope of national law. In its judgments of 28 March 1979 in Case 175/78, Saunders, [1979] 
ECR 1129 of 27 October 1982 in Joined Cases 35 and 36/82, Morson and Jhanjan, [1982] 
ECR 3723, and of 28 June 1984 in Case 180/83, Moser, it stated that Community law does 
not apply to purely internal situations in which there is no factor linking them to 
Community law. Mention must be made of the orders by which the Court, on the ground of 
its manifest lack of jurisdiction, refused requests for a preliminary ruling submitted by the 
Tribunal d'Instance, Hayange, on purely internal questions (order of 27 June 1979 in Case 
105/79, [1979] ECR 2257 and of 12 March 1980, Case 68/80, [1980] ECR 771). 
48 A strange case merits mention in this connection: judgment of 22 November 1978 in Case 
93178, Mattheus v Doego, [1978] ECR 2203, in which the parties were a fruit dealer and a 
fruit importer, respectively. Mattheus had concluded with Doego a contract relating to mar-
ket surveys in Spain and Portugal. The contract contained a clause providing for cancel-
lation in the event of the accession of those two States to the Community proving to be 
practically or legally impossible, and that the question was to be dealt with by the Court of 
Justice. Doego sought to rely upon that clause and proceedings were commenced before the 
Amtsgericht Essen, which decided to ask the Court whether the conditions for the accession 
of those two States to the Community were fulfilled. The Court refused to reply, pointing 
out that the question was a political one which was still open and was a matter for the 
competent political institutions and not a court. 
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49 The Pretore di Bra, apparently sure of his legal ground, refused to accept the view of the 
Court expressed in the judgment of 11 March 1980, and this led to the judgment of 16 De-
cember 1981 in Case 244/80 Foglia v Novello (II), [1981] ECR 3045. On this occasion, the 
questions submitted by the national court related to the interpretation of Article 177 and 
were irrefutably admissible. In reply, the Court endeavoured to explain the philosophy of 
Article 177 and the reciprocal nature of the duties which it involves. For the rest, it 
confirmed its refusal to consider the questions submitted in the first case of the same name. 
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Among the recent publications on the subject of preliminary rulings, the following may be 
recommended 
F. G. JACOBS and A. DuRAND: References to the European Court: Practice and Procedure, 
Butterworths, London 1975. 
G. VANDERSANDEN, A. BARAV: Contentieux Communautaire, Brussels 1977. 
G. BEBR: Development of Judicial Control of the European Communities, The Hague 1981. 
R.M. CHEVALLIER and D. MAIDANI: Luxembourg 1982, Guide Pratique, Article 177 CEE, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Com-
munities, No CB-32-81-431-FR-C. 
H. ScHERMERS: Judicial protection in the European Communities, 
3rd Edition, Deventer, 1983. 
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ANNEX/ 
Text of the Articles cited 
ECSC TREATY 
Article 41 
The Court shall have sole jurisdiction to give 
preliminary rulings on the validity of acts of 
the High Authority and of the Council where 
such validity is in issue in proceedings brought 
before a national court or tribunal. 
EEC TREATY 
Article 164 
The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the 
interpretation and application of this Treaty 
the law is observed. 
Article 169 
If the Commission considers that a Member 
State has failed to fulfil an obligation under 
this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned Opinion 
on the matter after giving the State concerned 
the opportunity to submit its observations. 
If the State concerned does not comply with 
the Opinion within the period laid down by 
the Commission, the latter may bring the mat-
ter before the Court of Justice. 
Article 173 
The Court of Justice shall review the legality 
of acts of the Council and the Commission 
other than recommendations or Opinions. It 
shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in 
actions brought by a Member State, the 
Council or the Commission on grounds of 
lack of competence, infringement of an essen-
tial procedural requirement, infringement of 
this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its 
application, or misuse of powers. 
Any natural or legal person may, under the 
same conditions, institute proceedings against 
a decision addressed to that person or against 
a decision which, although in the form of a 
regulation or a decision addressed to another 
person, is of direct and individual concern to 
the former. 
The proceedings provided for in this Article 
shall be instituted within two months of the 
publication of the measure, or of its notifi-
cation to the plaintiff, or, in the absence 
thereof, of the day on which it came to the 
knowledge of the latter, as the case may be. 
Article 174 
If the action is well founded, the Court of 
Justice shall declare the act concerned to be 
void. 
In the case of a regulation, however, the 
Court of Justice shall, if it considers this 
necessary, state which of the effects of the 
regulation which it has declared void shall be 
considered as definitive. 
Article 177 
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings concerning: 
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; 
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts 
of the institutions of the Community; 
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies 
established by an act of the Council, where 
those statutes so provide. 
Where such a question is raised before any 
court or tribunal of a Member State, that 
court or tribunal may, if it considers that a 
decision on the question is necessary to enable 
it to give judgment, request the Court of 
Justice to give a ruling thereon. 
Where any such question is raised in a case 
pending before a court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State, against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law, that court 
or tribunal shall bring the matter before the 
court of Justice. 
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ANNEX/I 
The Cilfit Judgment 
Is wool an agricultural product within the 
meaning of the EEC Treaty? That was the 
question which the Italian Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione had to consider. Rather than sub-
mitting that question, to which the answer 
seemed to it to be obvious, the Corte Suprema 
di Cassazione asked a question on the inter-
pretation of the third paragraph of Article 
177 in the following terms: 
'Does the third paragraph of Article 177 of 
the EEC Treaty, which provides that where 
any question of the same kind as those listed 
in the first paragraph of that Article is raised 
in a case pending before a national court or 
tribunal against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law, that court 
or tribunal must bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice lay down an obligation so to 
submit the case which precludes the national 
court from determining whether the question 
raised is justified or does it, and if so within 
what limits, make the obligation conditional 
on the prior finding of a reasonable interpret-
ative doubt?' 
Here is the Court's answer: 
5. 'In order to answer that question it is 
necessary to take account of the system estab-
lished by Article 177, which confers jurisdic-
tion on the Court of Justice to give prelimi-
nary rulings on, inter alia, the interpretation 
of the Treaty and the measures adopted by 
the institutions of the Community. 
6. The second paragraph of that Article pro-
vides that any court or tribunal of a Member 
State may, if it considers that a decision on a 
question of interpretation is necessary to en-
able it to give judgment, request the Court of 
Justice to give a ruling thereon. The third pa-
ragraph of that article provides that, where a 
question of interpretation is raised in a case 
pending before a court or tribunal of a Mem-
ber State against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law, that court 
or tribunal shall bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice. 
40 
7. That obligation to refer a matter to the 
Court of Justice is based on cooperation, es-
tablished with a view to ensuring the proper 
application and uniform interpretation of 
Community law in all the Member States, be-
tween national courts, in their capacity as 
courts responsible for the application of 
Community law, and the Court of Justice. 
More particularly, the third paragraph of Ar-
ticle 177 seeks to prevent the occurrence with-
in the Community of divergences in judicial 
decisions on questions of Community law. 
The scope of that obligation must therefore 
be assessed, in view of those objectives, by 
reference to the powers of the national courts, 
on the one hand, and those of the Court of 
Justice, on the other, where such a question 
of interpretation is raised within the meaning 
of Article 177. 
8. In this connection, it is necessary to de-
fine the meaning for the purposes of Com-
munity law of the expression 'where any such 
question is raised' in order to determine the 
circumstances in which a national court or 
tribunal against whose decisions there is no 
judicial remedy under national law is obliged 
to bring a matter before the Court of Justice. 
9. In this regard, it must in the first place be 
pointed out that Article 177 does not consti-
tute a means of redress available to the parties 
to a case pending before a national court or 
tribunal. Therefore, the mere fact that a party 
contends that the dispute gives rise to a ques-
tion concerning the interpretation of Com-
munity law does not mean that the court or 
tribunal concerned is compelled to consider 
that a question has been raised within the 
meaning of Article 177. On the other hand, a 
national court or tribunal may, in an ap-
propriate case, refer a matter to the Court of 
Justice of its own motion. 
10. Secondly, it follows from the relation-
ship between the second and third paragraphs 
of Article 177 that the courts or tribunals re-
ferred to in the third paragraph have the same 
discretion as any other national court or tri-
bunal to ascertain whether a decision on a 
question of Community law is necessary to 
enable them to give judgment. Accordingly, 
those courts or tribunals are not obliged to 
refer to the Court of Justice a question con-
cerning the interpretation of Community law 
raised before them if that question is not 
relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that 
question, regardless of what it may be, can in 
no way affect the outcome of the case. 
11. If, however, those courts or tribunals 
consider that recourse to Community law is 
necessary to enable them to decide a case, Ar-
ticle 177 imposes an obligation on them to re-
fer to the Court of Justice any question of in-
terpretation which may arise. 
12. The question submitted by the Corte di 
Cassazione seeks to ascertain whether, in cer-
tain circumstances, the obligation laid down 
by the third paragraph of Article 177 might 
none the less be subject to certain restrictions. 
13. It must be remembered in this connec-
tion that in its judgment of 27 March 1963 in 
Joined Cases 28 to 30/62 (Do Costa v Neder-
lanrlse Belastingadministratie [1963] ECR 31) 
the Court ruled that: 'Although the third pa-
ragraph of Article 177 unreservedly requires 
courts or tribunals of a Member State against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy 
under national law . . . to refer to the Court 
every question of interpretation raised before 
them, the authority of an interpretation under 
Article 177 already given by the Court may 
deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus 
empty it of its substance. Such is the case 
especially when the question raised is ma-
terially identical with a question which has al-
ready been the subject of a preliminary ruling 
in a similar case.' 
14. The same effect, as regards the limits set 
to the obligation laid down by the third para-
graph of Article 177, may be produced where 
previous decisions of the Court have already 
dealt with the point of law in question, irre-
spective of the nature of the proceedings 
which led to those decisions, even though the 
questions at issue are not strictly identical. 
15. However, it must not be forgotten that 
in all such circumstances national courts and 
tribunals, including those referred to in the 
third paragraph of Article 177, remain en-
tirely at liberty to bring a matter before the 
Court of Justice if they consider it appro-
priate to do so. 
16. Finally, the correct application of 
Community law may be so obvious as to leave 
no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the 
manner in which the question raised is to be 
resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion 
that such is the case, the national court or 
tribunal must be convinced that the matter is 
equally obvious to the courts of the other 
Member States and to the Court of Justice. 
Only if those conditions are satisfied may the 
national court or tribunal refrain from sub-
mitting the question to the Court of Justice 
and take upon itself the responsibility for re-
solving it. 
17. However, the existence of such a pos-
sibility must be assessed on the basis of the 
characteristic features of Community law and 
the particular difficulties to which its inter-
pretation gives rise. 
18. To begin with, it must be borne in mind 
that Community legislation is drafted in 
several languages and that the different 
language versions are all equally authentic. 
An interpretation of a provision of Com-
munity law thus involves a comparison of the 
different language versions. 
19. It must also be borne in mind, even 
where the different language versions are en-
tirely in accord with one another, that Com-
munity law uses terminology which is peculiar 
to it. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that 
legal concepts do not necessarily have the 
same meaning in Community law and in the 
law of the various Member States. 
20. Finally, every provision of Community 
law must be placed in its context and inter-
preted in the light of the provisions of Com-
munity ,law as a whole, regard being had to 
the objectives thereof and to its state of evolu-
tion at the date on which the provision in 
question is to be applied. 
21. In the light of all those considerations, 
the answer to the question submitted by the 
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Corte Suprema di Cassazione must be that the 
third paragraph of Article 177 of the EEC 
Treaty is to be interpreted as meaning that a 
court or tribunal against whose decisions 
there is no judicial remedy under national law 
is required, where a question of Community 
law is raised before it, to comply with its 
obligation to bring the matter before the 
Court of Justice, unless it has established that 
the question raised is irrelevant or that the 
Community provision in question has already 
been interpreted by the Court or that the 
correct application of Community law is so 
obvious as to leave no scope for any 
reasonable doubt. The existence of such a 
possibility must be assessed in the light of the 
specific characteristics of Community law, the 
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particular difficulties to which its interpre-
tation gives rise and the risk of divergences in 
judicial decisions within the Community.' 
(Judgment of 6 October 1982 in Case 283/81 
[1982] V ECR 3415). 
*** 
There is an epilogue to this case. After re-
ceiving the above judgment, the Corte di 
Cassazione dealt with the substance of the 
problem and discovered that even the classifi-
cation of something as simple as wool gives 
rise to difficulties. It therefore submitted a 
question of interpretation to the Court, which 
gave rise to the second Ciljit judgment, on 29 
February 1984, in Case 77/83, [1984] ECR 
1257, which shows that the first Ciljit case 
was, after all, a pointless exercise. 
ANNEX/II 
Chronological list of decisions of the Court 
Unless otherwise stated, the decisions cited are judgments. The 
decisions which have made a particularly significant contri-
bution to the interpretation of Article 177 are marked with an 
asterisk 
* 6 April 1962, Case 13/61, Bosch v Van 
Rijn, [1962] ECR 45. First reference for a pre-
liminary ruling. Appeal in cassation against 
the reference to the Court is inoperative. Free-
dom of the national Court to submit its ques-
tion in a 'simple and direct' form. 
14 December 1962, Joined Cases 31 and 
33/62, W6hrmann and Lutticke, [1962] ECR 
501. In addition to bringing an action before 
the national court, the applicants applied to 
the Court of Justice for a decision on a dis-
puted Community measure. The Court ruled, 
inter alia, that only a national court is entitled 
to refer a question to the Court of Justice for 
such an appraisal, under Article 177. 
* 15 February 1963, Case 26/62, Van Gend & 
Loos, [1963] ECR 1. This judgment, which is 
fundamental to the legal structure of the 
Community, was given under the preliminary-
ruling procedure, at the request of a Nether-
lands court. It deals at the same time with the 
relationship between references for prelimi-
nary rulings and actions for the failure of a 
State to fulfil its obligations: the fact that 
such an action is brought does not exclude a 
parallel action by individuals. 
* 27 March 1963, Joined Cases 28 to 30/62, 
Da Costa v Nederlandse Belastingadministra-
tie, [1963] ECR 31. Where the Court has al-
ready given a ruling on a question of inter-
pretation, the obligation under the third 
paragraph of Article 177 becomes devoid of 
purpose. 
Order of 3 June 1964, Case 6/64, Costa v 
Enel, [1964] ECR 614. The intervention of a 
third party in proceedings for preliminary 
ruling is inadmissible. 
15 July 1964, Case 6/64, Costa v Enel, [1964] 
ECR 585. Another fundamental judgment, 
given in proceedings for a preliminary ruling 
in response to a request by an Italian court, in 
relation to a possible conflict between an 
internal law and Community law. Distinction 
between 'application' and 'interpretation' 
within the meaning of Article 177. 
4 February 1965, Case 20/64, Albatros, 
[1965] ECR 29. Distinction between 'applica-
tion' and 'interpretation' within the meaning 
of Article 177. 
* 1 December 1965, Case 16/65, Schwarze, 
[1965], ECR 877. On the spirit of cooperation 
which must underlie the preliminary-ruling 
procedure. 
* 9 December 1965, Case 44/65, Hessische 
Knappschajt, [1965] ECR 965. A party to the 
main proceedings is not entitled to raise a 
question which the national court has not sub-
mitted. 
* 30 June 1966, Case 61/65, Vaasen (nee 
G6bbels), [1966] ECR 261. With respect to a 
social security arbitration tribunal, the Court 
defined the criteria applicable to the concept 
of 'court or tribunal' within the meaning of 
Article 177. 
* 24 June 1969, Case 29/68, Milch-, Fett- und 
Eierkontor, [1969] ECR 165. An inter-
pretation given by the Court binds the 
national court but leaves it free to make a 
further reference to the Court if it considers 
itself insufficiently enlightened. 
6 October 1970, Case 9/70, Grad v Finanzamt 
Traunstein, [1970] ECR 825. Judgment on the 
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effect in the Member States of a Council de-
cision relied upon by an individual to resist 
payment of a national tax on transport 
(known as the 'Leberpfennig' case). 
* 17 December 1970, Case 11170, Interna-
tiona/e Hande/sgese//schaft, [1970] ECR 1125. 
A remarkable judgment in several respects. 
The Court deals in detail with the position of 
the national court. It states that the protection 
of fundamental rights is one of the 'general 
principles of law' which it must uphold. 
14 July 1971, Case 10171, Ministere Public, 
Luxembourg v Madeleine Muller, [1971] ECR 
723. Example of a question submitted in im-
precise terms. The Court defines the question 
in the light of the documents before it. 
* 12 December 1972, Joined Cases 21 to 
24/72, International Fruit Company NV, 
[1972] ECR 1219. The validity of measures 
adopted by institutions may be appraised, 
under Article 177, from the standpoint of 
their conformity with the rules of interna-
tional law. 
16 January 1974, Case 166173, Rheinmah/en, 
[1974] ECR 33. The right to submit a request 
for a preliminary ruling is conferred also 
upon a court giving judgment on a case sent 
back to it by an appellate court. 
* 30 January 1974, Case 127173, [1974] ECR 
51. Preliminary-ruling proceedings continue 
until such time as the question submitted by 
the national court has been withdrawn or has 
become devoid of purpose. 
* 30 April 1974, Case 181173, Haegeman, 
[1974] ECR 449. An international agreement 
concluded by the Council under Articles 228 
and 238 of the EEC Treaty is a measure 
adopted by one of the institutions of the 
Community, within the meaning of Article 
177. It forms an integral part of Community 
law and accordingly the Court has jurisdiction 
for the interpretation thereof. 
12 November 1974, Case 32174, Haaga, 
[1974] ECR 1201. Request for a preliminary 
ruling submitted in connection with non-
contentious proceedings, regarding registra-
tion of a company in the commercial register. 
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26 February 1975, Case 67174, Bonsignore, 
[1975] ECR 297. By means of a request for a 
preliminary ruling, a German administrative 
court cast doubt upon the case-law of the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht on the interpreta-
tion of a Community directive concerning the 
residence of foreign nationals. 
* 17 December 1975, Case 93175, Ad/erbium, 
[1975] ECR 2147. Lack of jurisdiction of the 
Court to rule on purely internal legal situ-
ations. 
* 3 February 1977, Case 52176, Benedetti, 
[ 1977] ECR 163. A preliminary ruling is 
binding upon the national court which re-
quests it. 
* 24 May 1977, Case 107176, Hoffmann-La 
Roche, [1977] ECR 957. Admissibility of re-
quests for preliminary rulings in interlocutory 
proceedings. 
15 February 1978, Case 96177, Bauche, [1978] 
ECR 383. This judgment, which concerns a 
question of validity, applies a general prin-
ciple of law, namely the principle that legis-
lation must not be retroactive (paragraph 48 
et seq.). 
9 March 1978, Case 106177, Simmentha/, 
[ 1978] ECR 629. An appeal to a constitutional 
court regarding a reference to the Court of 
Justice is inoperative. Consequences of the 
direct effect of Community law and its 
primacy over national law. Duty of the 
national court not to apply a law which is 
contrary to Community law. 
12 October 1978, Case 10178, Tayeb 
Belbouab, [1978] ECR 1915. In interpreting 
the regulation on social security (No 
1408171), the Court applies the 'principle of 
legal certainty' and that of the protection of 
'acquired rights' in order to resolve a problem 
of how the law is to be applied where various 
periods of time are involved. 
22 November 1978, Case 93178, Mattheus v 
Doego,[1978] ECR 2203. A political question, 
for which the Court had no jurisdiction. 
* 29 November 1978, Case 83178, Pigs Mar-
keting Board v Redmond, [1978] ECR 2347. 
An interesting judgment in several respects. It 
emphasizes the discretion and responsibility 
of the national court as regards taking the ini-
tiative in submitting requests for preliminary 
rulings and formulating the questions. It also 
shows how the Court deals with multiple 
questions. 
25 January 1979, Case 98178, Racke, [1979] 
ECR 69, and Case 99178, Decker, [1979] ECR 
101. Principles to be observed regarding 
publication and certainty in relation to the 
entry into force of Community regulations. 
20 February 1979, Case 120178, Rewe, [1979] 
ECR 649 ('Cassis de Dijon'). This judgment, 
which was given in response to questions sub-
mitted by a German court, had the effect of 
ensuring the free movement of goods by re-
moving non-tariff barriers to intra-Com-
munity trade. 
20 February 1979, Case 122178, Buitoni, 
[1979] ECR 677. The loss of a security merely 
by reason of delay in producing proof of an 
operation which was properly carried out is 
disproportionate in relation to the infringe-
ment penalized. The relevant provision of the 
regulation is invalid. 
28 March 1979, Case 175178, Saunders, 
[1979] ECR 1129. Lack of jurisdiction of the 
Court to rule on purely internal situations. 
* 5 April 1979, Case 148178, Tullio Ratti, 
[1979] ECR 1629. This judgment shows how 
problems of Community law may arise in 
criminal proceedings. 
16 May 1979, Case 84178, Angelo Tomadini, 
[1979] ECR 1801. This judgment, which is 
concerned with a question of validity, refers 
to the protection of the 'legitime expectations' 
of traders subject to administrative rules in 
the event of changes in legislation (paragraph 
20 et seq.). 
21 June 1979, Case 240178, Atalanta 
Amsterdam, [1979] ECR 2137. The ex-
cessively strict nature of a forfeiture clause 
laid down in a Commission regulation and 
applied automatically is contrary to the 
'principle of proportionality'. 
Order of 27 June 1979, in Case 105179, on the 
request for a preliminary ruling by the Tri-
bunal d'Instance, Hayange, [1979] ECR 2257. 
Lack of jurisdiction of the Court to rule on a 
purely internal situation. 
12 July 1979, Case 244/78, Union Laitiere 
Normande, [1979] ECR 2663. Example of 
artificial proceedings instituted before a 
French court with a view to obtaining, with 
the aid of the Court of Justice, an order 
condemning United Kingdom legislation on 
milk distribution. The Court replied to the 
question, but did so evasively. 
27 September 1979, Case 230178, Eridania, 
[1979] ECR 2749. Question as to the validity 
and interpretation of a regulation. The Court 
ruled, inter alia, that an economic advan-
tage does not constitute an 'acquired right'. 
* 13 December 1979, Case 44179, Lieselotte 
Hauer, [1979] ECR 3727. This preliminary 
ruling completes the Court's doctrine on the 
protection of fundamental rights in the Com-
munity legal order. It mentions as sources: 
general principles of law; constitutional tradi-
tions common to the Member States: inter-
national instruments including, primarily, the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
11 March 1980, Case 104179, Foglia v 
Novello (1), [1980] ECR 745. Example of arti-
ficial proceedings instituted before an Italian 
court in order to obtain, with the aid of the 
Court of Justice, an order condemning 
French legislation relating to the taxation of 
wine. The Court refused to reply. 
Order of the Court of 12 March 1980 in Case 
68/80, on a request for a preliminary ruling 
by the Tribunal d'Instance, Hayange, [1980] 
ECR 771. Lack of jurisdiction of the Court to 
rule on a purely internal situation. 
24 April 1980, Case 65179, Chatain, [1980] 
ECR 1345. Questions submitted by an exam-
ining magistrate for a preliminary ruling. 
Order of 18 June 1980, Case 138/80, Borker, 
[1980] ECR 1975. A Conseil de l'Ordre des 
Avocats [Bar Council] is not a 'court or tri-
bunal' within the meaning of Article 177. 
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8 October 1980, Case 810/79, Oberschaer, 
[1980] ECR 2747. Interpretation and validity. 
In this case, certain provisions of Regulation 
No 1408171 were held to be valid by virtue of 
the interpretation given to them. 
* 15 October 1980, Case 145179, Roquette 
Freres, [1980], ECR 2917. In this judgment, 
given in response to a question submitted by 
the Tribunal d'Instance, Lille, the Court held 
that a provision of a regulation on monetary 
compensatory amounts was invalid, but 
limited the effect in time of that finding by 
applying, by analogy, the second paragraph 
of Article 174 of the EEC Treaty. 
* 10 March 1981, Joined Cases 36 and 71/80, 
Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association 
and Others, [1981] ECR 735. Freedom of the 
national court to determine the stage at which 
reference should be made; advantage of estab-
lishing the facts before submitting a question 
to the Court. 
5 May 1981, Case 112/80, Durbeck, [1981] 
ECR 1095. Example of a 'test case' brought 
before the competent national court in order 
to obtain a decision, by way of preliminary 
ruling, on the validity of a Community 
measure on commercial policy. 
* 13 May 1981, Case 66/80, International 
Chemical Corporation, [1981] ECR 1191. 
Effect vis-a-vis third parties of a preliminary 
ruling that a Community measure is invalid. 
27 May 1981, Joined Cases 142 and 143/80, 
Essevi and Salengo, [1981] ECR 1413. By 
means of a request for a preliminary ruling, 
an Italian appeal court challenged decisions of 
the Corte Suprema di Cassazione given fol-
lowing a Commission decision which was in-
compatible with Community law. 
6 October 1981, Case 246/80, Broekmeulen, 
[1981] ECR 2311. An appeals committee of a 
doctors association, which is recognized by 
the State and operates with the consent and 
cooperation of the public authorities, may be 
recognized as a 'court or tribunal' within the 
meaning of Article 177. 
* 16 December 1981, Case 244/80, Foglia v 
Novello (II), [1981] ECR 3045. This judgment 
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draws the dividing line between the preroga-
tives of the national court and those of the 
Court of Justice in the preliminary-ruling 
procedure. Reciprocal duty of cooperation. 
19 January 1982, Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v 
Finanzamt Munster, [1982] ECR 53. Effect of 
directives within the Member States. An indi-
vidual may rely upon a directive to defeat a 
tax law which has not been adapted within the 
prescribed period. 
* 23 March 1982, Case 102/81, Nordsee 
[1982] ECR 1095. An arbitrator voluntarily 
appointed by parties to a private contract is 
not a 'court or tribunal' within the meaning 
of Article 177. 
5 May 1982, Case 15/81, Schul, [1982] ECR 
1409. Interpretation and validity: certain pro-
visions of the Sixth VAT Directive were held 
to be valid by virtue of the interpretation 
given to them. 
18 May 1982, Joined Cases 115 and 116/81, 
Adoui et Cornouaille, [1982] ECR 1665. 
Example of an excessive number of questions 
submitted for a preliminary ruling. 
* 6 October 1982, Case 283/81, Cilfit (/), 
[1982] ECR 3415. This judgment deals with 
the power of appraisal of national courts of 
last instance with regard to the obligation 
contained in the third paragraph of Article 
177. 
27 October 1982, Joined Cases 35 and 36/82, 
Morson and Jhanjan, [1982] ECR 3723. 
Admissibility of a reference to the Court in 
interlocutory proceedings. Lack of jurisdic-
tion of the Court to rule upon purely internal 
situations. 
* 16 March 1983, Case 266/81, SlOT, 
[1983] ECR 731, and Joined Cases 267 to 
269/81, SPI and Michelin, [1983] ECR 801. 
It is important for all agreements binding the 
Community, both those concluded by the 
Community and those in which the Com-
munity is substituted for the Member States 
(such as GATT), to be applied in the same 
way throughout the Community, in the inter-
ests of unity of commercial policy and the 
normal conduct of intra-Community trade. 
For that reason, the Court has jurisdiction 
under Article 177 to interpret all such 
agreements. 
11 May 1983, Case 87/82, Rogers v Dar-
thenay, [1983] ECR 1579. Question of inter-
pretation intended to supply a lacuna in the 
Community rules. 
17 May 1983, Case 168/82, European Coal 
and Steel Community v Liquidator of Ferriere 
Sant'Anna SpA, [1983] ECR 1681. The only 
reference for a preliminary ruling under the 
ECSC Treaty. Concept of 'acts' within the 
meaning of Article 41. 
6 October 1983, Joined Cases 2 to 4/82, 
Delhaize [1983] ECR 2973. Refusal of the 
Court to have regard to an appeal by a 
government against the decision to seek a 
preliminary ruling. 
* 9 November 1983, Case 199/82, San 
Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595. Reference to the 
well-established case-law whereby 'every court 
or tribunal of a Member State is entitled to 
ask the Court for a preliminary ruling under 
Article 177, regardless moreover of the stage 
reached in the proceedings pending before it 
and regardless of the nature of the decision 
which it is called upon to give'. Application to 
the case of Italian 'injunction' proceedings. 
17 November 1983, Case 292/82, Merck, 
[1983] ECR 37&1. Interpretation and validity: 
the interpretation given to certain provisions 
on the common organization of the market in 
sugar rendered devoid of purpose the question 
submitted as to the validity of those pro-
visions. 
31 January 1984, Joined Cases 286/82 and 
26/83 Luisi and Carbone, [1984] ECR 377. 
Ruling that it is for the national court to 
determine whether controls on transfers of 
foreign currency are in conformity with the 
limits defined by the Court. 
22 February 1984, Case 70/83, Kloppenburg, 
[1984] ECR 1075. Judgment given in response 
to a request by the Finanzgericht Nieder-
sachsen, which is identical in substance to the 
Ursula Becker judgment. The Bundesfinanz-
hof, on appeal from the judgment delivered 
by the Finanzgericht, refused to accept the 
ruling of the Court of Justice as to the inter-
nal effect of directives in the event of non-
implementation by a Member State. 
29 February 1984, Case 77/83, Ciljit (II), 
[1984] ECR 1257. Following the first Cilfit 
judgment, the Italian Corte Suprema di 
Cassazione submitted to the Court a question 
on the legal classification of wool; when that 
question arose in the first case, the answer 
appeared so obvious that the question was not 
submitted. 
28 March 1984, Joined Cases 47 and 48/83, 
Pluimveeslachterij, [1984] ECR 1721. Ruling 
that it is for the national court to consider 
whether quality and marketing rules laid 
down in national regulations are compatible 
with the common organization of the market 
in poultry. 
28 June 1984, Case 180/83, Moser. Lack of 
jurisdiction of the Court to rule on purely 
internal situations. 
12 July 1984, Case 218/83, Les Rapides 
Savoyards. Reference by the French Cour de 
Cassation relating to the EEC/Switzerland 
free trade agreement. The observations sub-
mitted by the Commission to the Court show 
that the entire previous procedure, which had 
lasted for six years, was based on a misappre-
hension. 
* 27 February 1985, Case 112/83, Societe de 
Mai's. The Court reaffirmed, giving further 
reasons for its ruling, that the second para-
graph of Article 174, which enables it to limit 
in time the effect of a finding that a regula-
tion is invalid, applies to preliminary rulings. 
4 July 1985, Case 168/84, Berkholz. Typical 
example of a question submitted by a national 
court for a preliminary ruling on the interpre-
tation of a directive, to enable it to ensure 
that the national law adopted to implement 
the directive is interpreted correctly. 
9 July 1985, Case 179/84, Bozzetti. Ruling 
that it is for the national court to determine 
whether it has jurisdiction regarding classifi-
cation of an agricultural levy. 
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